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Abstract 
Climate change presents a clear threat to modern civilization in both the near and long term. 
Nations with the ability to pursue cleantech research and development have a mandate to do 
so. The question of how best to undertake this task then naturally arises. The purpose of this 
thesis is to examine one possible method of promoting cleantech entrepreneurship:  a 
cleantech-focused combination incubator-prototyping space. Using the resource based view, I 
make a case study of Greentown Labs, a space which fits this profile. I will examine how and 
why the particular combination of resources found in Greentown Labs supports the needs of 
its cleantech-focused hardware member companies. I further explore role of external inputs in 
contributing to overall performance. I will also show how the member companies can act as 
resources for each other. Finally, I consider the degree to which the resource rich environment 
supports effectual processes among its members. 
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 But green's the color of Spring. 
And green can be cool and friendly-like. 
And green can be big like an ocean, or important like a mountain, or tall like a tree. 
When green is all there is to be 
It could make you wonder why, but why wonder?  
Why wonder, I am green and it'll do fine, it's beautiful! 
And I think it's what I want to be. 
 
Excerpt from: (It’s not that easy) Bein’ green 
Written by: Joe Raposo 
Sung by: Kermit the Frog 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
This study is motivated by a rare alignment of environmental and economic incentives. 
Current and future climate change presents a serious risk to human and natural systems (Field 
et al.). Since 2000, the carbon emission rate has steadily risen at an average rate of 3% per 
year. If emissions continue at this rate, the global climate is predicted to increase a total of  
4.9 °C by the end of the century, well past the 2 °C safety limit proscribed by scientists 
(Sanford et al.). The need for cleantech1 innovation is clear. 
At the same time, the dominance of the petroleum industry in Norway threatens its long term 
economic stability. At present, nearly 250 000 high-tech, high-paying jobs within Norway – 
roughly 7.5% of the working age population - depend directly on oil (Fjose, Guldbrandsen 
and Holmen; SSB.no). With 52% of Norway’s export revenues, 23% GDP and 30% of 
government revenues derived from the petroleum industry (Directorate), there is consensus 
about the need to diversify the Norwegian economy and lessen its dependence on oil.  
Despite this, Norway has struggled with innovation and entrepreneurship in recent years. The 
2014 survey of Norway by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) succinctly sums up the state of affairs, “Current prosperity has tended to disguise a 
slowing of underlying productivity growth” (OECD).  A number of indicators support this 
assessment. When considering product-process innovation in the most recent Eurostat 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) survey, Norway ranked at 20 out of 30 countries listed, 
while their Nordic peers of Sweden, Finland and Denmark have ranked at 6, 12 and 13 
respectively (Gunnes et al.). 
Another common measure of innovation and entrepreneurial activity in a given country is the 
ratio of startup companies to more mature companies. Norway’s entrepreneurial activity, as 
measured in this way, has lagged behind many of its peers in recent years. This can be seen in 
Figure 1. 
1 Technology-based solutions to environmental challenges are broadly  referred to as “cleantech”. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of startup companies by country. A startup is defined as a firm which is 0-2 years old. 
(OECD) 
This broader trend is also reflected within the cleantech sector. Since 2010, the Nordic Clean 
Tech Open has periodically accepted applications from innovative cleantech companies in 
Nordic countries (and Estonia as well now). The Top 25 applicants are awarded with media 
exposure, access to networking opportunities, business development assistance, software 
licenses, a showcase day and other forms of support. The number of total applicants, as well 
as Top 25 finalists, by country, for all of the Nordic Clean Tech open events held to date are 
shown in Figure 2. The 2013-2014 competition round experienced a dramatic drop in both the 
number of Norwegian finalists and applicants. 
 
Figure 2. Nordic Clean Tech Open Top 25 finalists and applicants. Data from: (nordiccleantechopen.com)  
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In spite of these pressing environmental and economic incentives, it seems that Norwegian 
cleantech innovation and entrepreneurship is in a state of decline. What can be done?  
1.2 Goal 
In order to stimulate cleantech innovation in Norway, a complex and multilayered response -- 
from the grassroots level efforts to national policy changes -- may be required before 
observable results arise. An examination of the breadth of such efforts is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Instead, this study aims to take an in depth look at one possible mechanism to 
support cleantech entrepreneurs. 
In recent decades, new technology- or science- based business incubators have gained in 
popularity as a tool for governments to stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship in their 
jurisdictions (Phan, Siegel and Wright). This is particularly the case for developed countries, 
who wish to emulate the early successes of similar entities found in the US, notably the areas 
surrounding Stanford University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
(Etzkowitz). The basic premise behind these initiatives is that, by providing an array of basic 
services and resources needed to start a business, and often by partnering with a local 
university for knowledge and research based technology transfer, these entities lower the 
barriers to entry for high-risk, often resource intensive technology-based ventures (Colombo 
and Delmastro). Such ventures are often perceived as too risky by more traditional business 
funding mechanism like banks and even venture capital (Mazzucato).  Therefore, they are 
deemed worthy of public support because they often result in new market formation, job 
creation and other net positive externalities 
However, current research on the effectiveness of incubators in supporting these kinds of 
ventures is mixed, with either neutral or only weakly positive findings, depending on the 
indicator being considered (Westhead et al.) (Colombo and Delmastro). Although new 
technology based firm business incubators do seem to have a small positive effect on their 
members, as measured by certain indicators (which will be explored in more detail later), it is 
not well understood why this is case. There are a great many variables to be considered when 
conducting such an analysis. So, it is assumed that the “secret recipe” for a successful 
incubator has simply not been found yet, and further that the notion of a “secret recipe” itself 
is indeed too simplistic, despite its apparent favor in the current research. Therefore, the goal 
of this study is to explore the ways in which an incubator may support the cleantech driven 
ambitions of its members. 
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1.3 Observations and assumptions 
To explore this topic in a more focused way, a number of general observations and 
assumptions are made. First, it is observed that many cleantech innovations are physical. 
There are materials, manufacturing and transportation requirements that must be factored into 
the business model for such products. Furthermore, hardware based cleantech innovations 
have special resource requirements related to the research, development and testing of their 
associated product that differ from software and service-based innovations. 
It is further observed that most business incubators today are suited to supporting companies 
without physical products, such as software based companies. Although it is certainly possible 
to engage in cleantech entrepreneurship without a physical product – for example, through 
software or business model innovation -- if an incubator is to support the full range of 
cleantech activities, then it must also consider the needs of companies with physical products. 
There are many way to go about this. For this study, it is assumed that an incubator should 
provide access to a space where members can develop, test and store their prototypes, to fully 
support the range of cleantech entrepreneurship. 
A second observation is also made: “cleantech” is a very broad term. Despite its frequent use, 
there is not yet a firm consensus on what it truly means. Nonetheless, the MIT Clean Energy 
Prize (CEP) offers the following definition, which seems to encompass the full range: “Clean 
energy technologies, services or processes are defined as those that broadly reduce energy 
consumption and/or enable the transition to a renewable-based energy economy by increasing 
the supply of renewable energy (RE), improving the efficiency of energy utilization at the 
consumer and industrial scale (EE), improving the processes and systems that use energy 
(I&R), or more effectively enabling energy solutions to permeate the marketplace (I&R).” 
(cep.mit.edu) 
Despite the broad range of possibilities in cleantech innovation, it is further observed that 
there seems to be a particular set of resources and capabilities which are useful to cleantech 
entrepreneurs in general. For example, there is a limited supply of dedicated capital for 
cleantech innovation, as well as relevant industry networks for different applications. 
Therefore, a second assumption is made: a combination prototyping facility and incubator 
would be even better suited to support cleantech entrepreneurship if it had a cleantech focus. 
The Association of Cleantech Incubators of New England (ACTION) defines a cleantech 
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incubator as follow: “Cleantech incubators are typically non-profit organizations that are 
dedicated to accelerating the success of early-stage companies engaged in the development of 
technology, products, or services for the cleantech industry.” (actionnewengland.org). When 
situated in the broader context of effective programs and policies, it is hypothesized that a 
cleantech incubator which also provides a prototyping space could act as a useful tool for 
assisting cleantech entrepreneurs transform their ideas into successful products. 
1.4 Research Question 
Given the above observations and assumptions, the following research question is posed: 
How can a cleantech-focused incubator-prototyping space ecosystem 
support the entrepreneurial processes of its members? 
Greentown Labs -- affectionately referred to as “Greentown” by those who interact with it -- 
is an incubator-prototyping space, with a focus on cleantech. It was chosen as the sole focus 
of this study because, as we will later see, this combination of features is presently unique.  
In this paper, I make a case study of Greentown to explore the research question in depth. The 
attendant propositions are informed by existing literature on incubator effectiveness, as well 
as the resource based view of the firm and theory of effectuation. Following a review of the 
literature, I present a brief history of Greentown and an overview of the methodology 
employed. 
In the discussion section, I consider four propositions. These propositions are as follow:  
Proposition 1: A cleantech-focused incubator can act as a 
convergence point for industry relevant input streams. 
Proposition 2: A cleantech-focused incubator can provide member 
companies access to relevant strategic resources.  
Proposition 3: The combination of incubator and prototyping space 
facilitates a culture of sharing that helps members accelerate each 
other’s businesses. 
Proposition 4: The cleantech-focused prototype-incubator ecosystem 
supports effectual processes of entrepreneurs.  
These are evaluated based on the evidence from my interview subjects and other data sources. 
I will discuss whether and how the propositions are supported by the evidence. I will conclude 
with a summary of the findings, their theoretical and practical implications, as well as 
suggestions for future research. 
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2 Literature Review 
The research question and propositions were based on a number of theories and existing 
research. This section gives an overview of this theoretical basis and how it relates to the 
given case. 
2.1 Getting physical: incubators, co-working spaces and maker spaces 
Greentown is difficult to label. It self-identifies as a ‘co-working space’. It is also a business 
incubator, although not an accelerator (more on that later). Greentown additionally offers on-
site access to a prototyping space, along with institutional membership to a maker space2 
situated next door (Asylum). Although Greentown is of interest in this study because of the 
assumedly unique synergies arising from these co-located physical spaces, it is still helpful to 
consider the existing research on these types of spaces individually. So, in this section I will 
provide a brief overview of the literature on business incubators, co-working spaces and 
maker spaces. 
2.1.1 By any other name: business incubators, science parks, innovation centers… 
The ‘business incubator’ phenomenon has been referred to variously over the years as 
‘Research Parks’ ‘Science Parks’, ‘Knowledge Parks’,  ‘Seedbeds’, ‘Industrial Parks’, 
‘Innovation Centers’, ‘Technopoles’ and ‘Networked Incubators’ (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi). 
These all refer to the same essential system, existing within various contexts. The National 
Business Incubator Association (NBIA) defines an incubator as: "a business support process 
that accelerates the successful development of startup and fledgling companies by providing 
entrepreneurs with an array of targeted resources and services."  (NBIA "What Is Business 
Incubation?")  Business incubator services typically fall into three categories: tangible 
resources related to office facilities and equipment, business development related services and 
access to incubator networks. (Abduh et al.). 
The use of ‘accelerates’ in the NBIA’s definition is somewhat misleading. Although the two 
terms are frequently confused, a ‘business incubator’ is distinct from a ‘business accelerator’ 
(Lennon) (Mielach; Cohen). An accelerator provides many of the same support services as an 
incubator to its members, but only for a short time, usually on the order of 3-6 months. 
2 At the time of writing, Artisan’s Asylum is the largest maker space in the world, occupying a 40,000 square 
foot warehouse, has 250 monthly members, along with 140 studios and 45 storage pallets for rent (Artisan’s 
Asylum 2014). It is connected to the Greentown Labs building by an underground tunnel.  
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Accelerators also tend to take equity in exchange for seed funding. Incubators generally let 
their members stay for much longer, but do not offer funding and typically charge their 
members rent to cover operational costs (Cohen). 
While many incubators operate privately – as either for-profit or non-profit entities- they have 
also become a popular vehicle for government sponsored innovation initiatives in numerous 
countries (Aernoudt). As such, a body of research has emerged surrounding incubator 
effectiveness, as a matter of public policy (Lewis; Westhead). This research may shed light on 
the resources provided by an incubator, in terms of firm performance and competitive 
advantage. 
Public support for business incubators which assist new technology based firms (NTBF) is 
generally justified with two complementary reasons. The first argument is that the NTBFs 
lack access to key inputs (i.e., capital), due to the conservative nature of banks. In short, 
NTBFs are too risky for most banker’s appetites and so NTBFs suffer from credit rationing, 
despite their inherent potential (Colombo and Delmastro). Although venture capitalists can 
and do fill this gap to a certain extent, this is not always the case, particularly in markets such 
as cleantech (Mazzucato). The second case for NTBF incubators stems from assumptions 
surrounding their value to advanced economies. As common sources for radical innovation, 
advocates for public support suggest that the potential returns of opening up new business 
segments and market creation that may result from successful NTBF ventures would 
outweigh the costs of support (Oakey). 
However, business incubators have also been the subject of criticism. It is argued that, by 
shielding their members market forces, nascent firms in incubators do not receive the 
necessary feedback to adapt to survive outside. Instead, they are adapted for survival in the 
incubator context and may therefore survive longer than they would otherwise, but inevitably 
fail (Cohen) (Colombo and Delmastro). Indeed, despite the compelling arguments in support 
of business incubators, empirical support for their positive impact on firm performance is 
limited (Siegel, Westhead and Wright).  
There are relatively few studies available which perform a matched-pair analysis of 
comparable incubated and non-incubated control firms. When looking at university-linked 
‘science parks’, Westhead and Storey found no statistically significant differences between 
on- and off-park firms, in terms of the number of patents or copyrights filed (Westhead et al.). 
7 
 
It was also later found that there was no significant difference in the number of new products 
or services launched between on- and off-park firms (Westhead).  
However, the 1994 study also showed that on-park firms experienced higher growth rates than 
their off-park counterparts. Furthermore, the on-park firms appeared able to attract more 
qualified engineers and entrepreneurs, as measured by degree attainment. A similar study by 
Colombo and Delmastro (2002) later confirmed these same positive correlations. Their study 
also showed that on-park firm’s founders had a higher average education level, that they had easier 
access to public subsidies and grants (in Italy), a higher rate of adoption of innovative information and 
communication technologies, and a higher rate of participation in research projects sponsored by the 
EU (Colombo and Delmastro). 
There is a severe methodological constraint in isolating the effect of an incubator on firm 
performance: In the case where incubated and independent firms can be seen to perform 
differently by a given measure, is it because incubator membership is often selective and 
curated; i.e., their chances of success were higher ex ante? Although the Colombo and 
Delmastro study attempts to control for this by considering founder education level and stated 
personal motivation, there are often many additional variables that go into an incubator 
screening process (Mian). Does this question matter if the presence of an incubator attracts 
highly educated talent to a region? A deeper pursuit of these questions is regrettably beyond 
the scope of this study. They are provided here simply as a conceptual backdrop for the first 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: A cleantech-focused incubator can act as a 
convergence point for industry relevant input streams. 
2.1.2 Coworking spaces 
The first use of the term ‘coworking’ was in 1999 (Deskmag "The History of Coworking 
Presented by Deskmag"). However, the popularization of the idea is generally credited to 
Brad Neuberg, a programmer who decided, in 2005, to start a space that afforded him the 
freedom of a freelancer but community of an office (DeGuzman, Tang and McKellar) 
Between 2005 and 2011, coworking spaces mushroomed over the globe. In more recent years, 
the rate of annual growth has slowed, but is still positive (Deskmag "The Coworking Forecast 
2014"). Nonetheless, the movement is relatively new, so a precise definition is elusive and 
existing literature sparse. 
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But in general, coworking refers to the set-up and dynamics of a 
diverse group of people who don’t necessarily work for the same 
company or on the same project, working alongside each other, 
sharing the working space and resources, such as Internet connection, 
office equipment and coffee… Enshrined in the coworking movement 
is the philosophy that seemingly disparate groups of people with 
different projects and goals, working together yet independently in a 
single space, sharing facilities and establish rapport with each other- 
can lead to mutual benefits. (DeGuzman, Tang and McKellar) 
The line between a ‘coworking space’ and a ‘business incubator’ is blurry at times, although 
there are some notable differences. Incubators tend to focus on businesses which can scale up, 
while co-working spaces are also open to freelancers looking for office space. Incubators also 
tend to curate their members - for example, by only allowing members that have received 
seed funding – while coworking spaces are more open to all kinds of applicants. Incubators 
tend to offer mentorship and business development services, while co-working spaces do not 
necessarily offer more to their members than a shared office space and a sense of community. 
(Spinuzzi) (DeGuzman, Tang and McKellar) (NBIA "Selecting Clients") 
Coworking spaces may perhaps be considered spiritual cousins to ‘maker spaces,’ which are 
described in the next section. 
2.1.3 Maker Spaces 
Over the past decade or so, maker/hacker spaces3 have exploded in popularity, particularly 
within Europe and North America (Moilanen). Although a conclusive definition of “maker 
space” has yet to be agreed upon, the following two features are viewed as essential: 1) a 
physical space which contains a shared set of tools 2) a member community which has access 
to the space and tools and, often, instruction on how to use them.  
Unlike business incubators, which provide shared resources such as coaching and networking 
venues with the express purpose of helping member businesses grow (Peters, Rice and 
Sundararajan), maker spaces are not specifically designed to promote entrepreneurship or 
business development. They are, as the name suggests, a place for members to make things. 
The website hackerspaces.org contains a list of all spaces around the world, or at least all of 
those who choose to register with the site. At the time of writing, approximately one thousand 
spaces have been registered worldwide. The number is approximate because the status of each 
3 The appellations “maker space” and “hacker space” are frequently used interchangeably. There has been 
considerable debate about whether they are distinct entities. However, as neither has been successfully defined 
and both self-identifying “hacker spaces” and “maker spaces” share the essential characteristics listed, I have 
adopted the convention of referring to them uniformly as “maker space(s)” for the remainder of this study. 
9 
 
                                                          
space—whether they are in planning phases, active or retired—is unclear. In addition to the 
registry, the site provides a wiki, which includes a dedicated “theory” page. Through this, site 
contributors grapple with the definition of a “hacker space,” what kind of spaces should be 
allowed to register on the site, and other related subjects.  A careful reader of this page, email 
list archives and related articles, in early 2014, would conclude that a consensual definition of 
“hacker space/maker space,” or dominant discourse on the movement’s roots has yet to 
emerge. 
Nonetheless, the following “red thread” is observed:  
Maker spaces that meet the essential criteria—a physical location where members can 
collaborate and share resources to work on individual and group projects over time—is 
perhaps an age-old phenomenon. However, the roots of the newest wave of this type of 
community can be traced to a convention hosted by the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) Berlin 
in 2007. CCC Berlin was founded in 1981 and had been quietly gaining momentum through 
the 80’s and 90’s. It inspired several other such spaces in Germany and Austria, most of 
which were founded in the late 90’s. In 2007, CCC Berlin held the Chaos Communication 
Camp, a convention which attracted members of the DIY (Do It Yourself) community from 
all over the world. Among the attendants were the future founders of Noisebridge and NYC 
Resistor, some of the first and most well-known spaces in the US. Although a handful of 
spaces had existed in the US prior to this point, the nearly simultaneous founding of 
Noisebridge in San Francisco and NYC Resistor in New York City seemed to represent a 
tipping point, after which spaces began opening up at an exponential growth rate. Enthusiasm 
quickly both across the US and Europe, and has recently been picked up in several other 
countries. (Pettis, Astera and contributors; Gorenflo; Pettis; Schrock; Farr; DeGuzman, Tang 
and McKellar). 
Maker spaces typically offer classes on proper tool usage and opportunities for voluntary 
project demonstrations. In addition to formal learning and demonstration opportunities, 
members are encouraged to help each other and share expertise informally. They also often 
double as a social “third places” for active members. 
Greentown Labs members have institutional access to the maker space Artisan’s Asylum, in 
addition to an on-site prototyping space. Although the prototyping space is not a maker space, 
it does share some key features which will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
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2.2 Resource Based View 
The resource based view is used to understand a firm’s internal strengths and weaknesses. It 
asserts that different firms have access to different resources, a state commonly referred to as 
resource heterogeneity. Traditional applications of this are concerned with how access to 
specific types of different resources will enable some firms to have a competitive advantage 
over those that lack such resources. (Barney, 1991, Wernerfelt,1984, Peteraf, 1993). This 
section provides an overview of the resource based view, from its historical evolution through 
modern applications, as well as some of its extensions and limitations. 
2.2.1 Historical Evolution 
Although the “resource based view” was not referred to as such until Birger Wernerfeldt’s 
seminal paper, A resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt), the essential concepts can 
retrospectively be seen percolating through the strategic management community’s collective 
consciousness for some decades prior. These ideas grew up in response to the neoclassical 
microeconomic theory, which presumed resource homogeneity and differentiated firms based 
on external factors related to industry conditions and positioning (Penrose). Even in industries 
with high levels of competition and attendant cost pressures – industries which should not be 
profitable according to a more traditional industry based perspective - some firms manage to 
do extraordinarily well. Researchers therefore suggested that an internal examination of a 
firm’s strengths and weaknesses may explain this phenomenon. 
There were three separate research traditions related to  strengths and weaknesses, which 
eventually led to the more unified resource based model used today: theories of distinctive 
competence, Ricardian economics and Edith Penrose’s theory of firm growth (Barney 
Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage).  
The theories of distinctive competence first considered how general managers and 
institutional leaders affect firm performance. The underlying assumption is that high-quality 
general managers were a valuable organizational strength, while the inverse was also true 
(Learned et al.; Selznick). Similarly, “institutional leaders,” or those leaders who not only 
manage an organization, but also create and shape a firm’s organizational vision, can act as an 
organizational strength (Selznick). 
While general managers and organizational vision can be a strategic resource, they are not the 
only potential sources of internal firm strengths and weaknesses. David Ricardo considered 
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resources which are inelastic in supply. He suggested that firms with access to a finite 
resource may use it to extract economic rent in certain market conditions (Ricardo). Although 
Ricardo famously focused on land resources, this notion can be extended to include other 
kinds of resources in finite supply, such as institutional leaders, top talent, grant funding or 
access to relevant networks.  
Finally, Edith Penrose defined the firm as an administrative framework that organizes bundles 
of productive resources. She suggested that resource heterogeneity was a natural state, such 
that the bundles of productive resources controlled by different firms in the same industry 
could vary greatly (Penrose). The implication of this being that firms could gain and sustain a 
competitive advantage by acquiring particular resources, especially those with an inelastic 
supply. By providing access to certain resources – with both elastic and inelastic supplies – it 
will be argued later that Greentown Labs gives its members companies a competitive 
advantage. 
2.2.2 The Resource Based View Today 
These different branches of research eventually converged into the resource-based view of the 
firm, as it is understood today. There are two assumptions which underpin the modern 
framework. First, it is assumed that different firms within the same industry experience 
resource heterogeneity—i.e., they have access to distinct bundles of productive resources. 
Next, it is assumed that some resources may be immobile.  
There are generally four categories of resources that a firm may possess: financial capital, 
physical capital, human capital and organizational capital (Barney Gaining and Sustaining 
Competitive Advantage). Financial capital is the money from retained earnings, equity 
holders, bondholders and banks that firms have access to. Physical capital includes the firm’s 
raw materials, land, equipment and buildings and other physical assets. Human capital is the 
expertise and intelligence of a firm’s individual employees. In the modern framework, 
conceptions of human capital are not limited to senior managers, as Selznick and Learned et. 
al proposed, but can include employees at all levels. Finally, the organizational capital of a 
firm comes from the combination of individuals in an organized way. This can include 
Penrose’s administrative framework, company culture, quality assurance processes, planning 
structures, formal and informal relationships between individuals and groups within the firm, 
etc.  
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2.2.3 The VRIO framework: A practical application of the resource based view 
The VRIO (Value-Rarity-Imitability-Organization) framework provides one way to 
concretely analyze firm resources (Barney "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive 
Advantage"). It may be thought of as a series of selective filters for evaluating how effective a 
given resource’s intrinsic qualities may be in offering a competitive advantage to a firm. It 
also considers the question of how a resource is leveraged in its organizational context. 
 
Figure 3 Selective filters on a resource's intrinsic qualities 
Is it valuable? This is the first question to consider when analyzing a firm resource. In other 
words, does the resource enable the firm to create value for the customer, exploit market 
opportunities or combat threats? Does it allow the firm to respond to its environment? For 
instance, a theoretical solar panel manufacturer is able to produce panels that meet certain 
efficiency standards. This capability allows the solar panel company to create value for its 
customers and so it is a valuable resource. However, many firms within the same industry 
possess productive bundles that are valuable by these standards. So, in logical terms, 
possessing a resource which is exclusively valuable is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for a resource to offer a competitive advantage.  It simply enables parity among similar firms. 
A resource becomes more strategically significant when it is both valuable and rare. If our 
hypothetical solar panel manufacturer can create its panels at a faster rate than many of its 
competitors, then this capability is both valuable and rare. In this case, the resource may offer 
a competitive advantage over those firms that do not possess the given resource. However, 
other manufacturers may eventually learn to increase their production speeds. So, this 
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capability is not necessarily difficult to imitate and the competitive advantage offered is 
temporary. 
If a resource is valuable and rare and difficult to imitate – perhaps it has an effectively 
inelastic supply – then it may be a source of sustained competitive advantage. Imagine, for 
instance, that our solar panel manufacturer also has an institutional leader who shapes the 
company’s vision and inspires its workforce to greater productivity levels while also inspiring 
its customer base to evangelize the product. This institutional leader may offer a sustained 
competitive advantage for as long as they are with the company.  
After considering whether a given resource is intrinsically valuable, rare and difficult to 
imitate, we can consider whether it is properly leveraged in its organizational context. The 
organization must have the ability to effectively employ its resources for it to offer a true 
advantage. “The question of organization operates as an adjustment factor in the VRIO 
framework.” (Barney Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage) When the organization 
of a firm is aligned to properly use its resources, it may also benefit from leveraging effects 
(Bowman and Ambrosini).  
A variant of the VRIO framework is that of VRIN, where ‘N’ stands for non-substitutable. In 
this framework, one considers whether a resource may be easily substituted by something else 
which serves the same function but is otherwise be valuable, rare and inimitable. 
2.2.4 Extending the resource based view with ‘dynamic capabilities’ 
A firm resource is also often referred to as a “capability” (Barney Gaining and Sustaining 
Competitive Advantage). There has been some academic debate on differences between “core 
competencies” and “capabilities” when discussing firm resources. However, these differences 
are both obscure and not topical to the current discussion, so I have adopted the convention of 
referring to generic “resources” and “capabilities” interchangeably. 
One critique of the resource based view is that a given capability may not lead a to 
competitive advantage in a fast-changing market, even if it is valuable, rare and difficult to 
imitate (D’Aveni). So, “dynamic capabilities” were conceived as an extension of the resource 
based view, to highlight capabilities which enable firms to thrive in dynamic markets (Teece 
and Pisano). A dynamic capability is defined as follows: 
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The firm’s processes that use resources – specifically the processes to 
integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources – to match and even 
create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational 
and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource 
configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and die. 
(Eisenhardt and Martin) 
Dynamic capabilities exist in contrast to substantive capabilities. A substantive capability may 
be intrinsically valuable, rare and difficult to imitate, but if it cannot evolve over time, it is of 
limited long term strategic value. Firms with dynamic capabilities therefore have the higher-
order ability to evolve, substitute and rearrange their substantive capabilities in response to 
market conditions (Zahra, Sapienza and Davidsson). 
Proposition 2: A cleantech-focused incubator can provide member 
companies access to relevant strategic resources.  
Proposition 3: The combination of incubator and prototyping space 
facilitates a culture of sharing that helps members accelerate each 
other’s businesses. 
2.2.5 Notable barriers to imitation 
When analyzing a firm, it is sometimes difficult to tease out which resources are the keys to 
its performance. Which capabilities are strengths? Which are weaknesses? How do these 
affect each other and how does this relate to firm performance? Even when it is possible to 
identify and catalog a firm’s resources, there are sometimes insurmountable barriers to 
imitation (beyond even an inelastic supply) for a given resource that make this kind of 
analysis of limited value. In this section, some conditions in which a resource cannot be easily 
imitated or identified are expounded upon. 
2.2.5.1 Path dependency 
The bounded nature of human cognition has been well accepted for some time (Simon). That 
is, humans have a limited ability to acquire, retain or process knowledge. 
Thus the events and prospective events that enter into our value 
systems are all dated, and the importance we attach to them generally 
drops off sharply with their distance in time. For the creatures of 
bounded rationality that we are, this is fortunate. If our decisions 
depended equally upon their remote and their proximate 
consequences, we could never act but would be forever lost in 
thought. By applying a heavy discount factor to events, attenuating 
them with their remoteness in time and space, we reduce our problems 
of choice to a size commensurate with our limited computing 
capabilities. (Simon) p 157 
 
A practical consequence of bounded rationality arises in organizational learning. When 
exposed to an overwhelming wealth of information, cooperative group subjects are prevented 
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from fully exploring a given problem space (Egidi and Narduzzo). The consequence being 
that when different subjects are exposed to different aspects of the same problem space, they 
tend to find only locally optimal solutions, depending on how they were taught about the 
problem space originally. 
In the context of the resource based view, this finding is significant when we also consider 
how organizational learning and business processes may be shaped by resource heterogeneity. 
That is, because different organizations inevitably have access to different resources, even 
within the same industry and operating at the same scale, they may experience vastly different 
outcomes due to the path dependent nature of organizational learning. In other words, 
although the resource based view may provide valuable insight into how a given case is 
successful, replication of that success is not guaranteed even when reasonable facsimiles of 
those resources are aggregated in other contexts  (Ray, Barney and Muhanna). 
Dierickx and Cool introduced the idea of “asset stock” versus “asset flow,” whose contrast 
also illustrates another kind of path dependence. They aptly describe this with metaphor:  
The fundamental distinction between stocks and flows may be 
illustrated by the "bath-tub" metaphor: at any moment in time, the 
stock of water is indicated by the level of water in the tub; it is the 
cumulative result of flows of water into the tub (through the tap) and 
out of it (through a leak). (Dierickx and Cool) p 1506  
Examples of asset stocks include a brand’s reputation, dealer loyalty, R&D capability and 
knowledge. These are resources which can only be accumulated over time, and are therefore 
path dependent and largely inimitable (although not necessarily non-substitutable) (Dierickx 
and Cool). This relates to the last manifestation of path dependency: unique historical 
conditions. Sometimes, a firm is able to achieve a strategic advantage due to specific 
historical events which cannot be replicated (Barney Gaining and Sustaining Competitive 
Advantage). For illustration, let us return to our hypothetical solar panel manufacturer. 
Imagine that it received a large US government contract to install panels on army bases all 
around the world, as part of an historic initiative to reduce their carbon footprint (remember, 
this is imaginary). This undertaking would require the development of a large world-wide 
supply and service network, and a set of organizational competencies for the solar panel 
manufacturer would nee to be developed. Such resources and capabilities on the same scale 
would be quite difficult for a competitor to imitate in the future, without a similar contract and 
conditions. Other examples of unique historical conditions might include a first-mover 
advantage or ownership of enforceable property rights (King). 
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2.2.5.2 Causal ambiguity  
Another significant barrier to resource imitation comes from causal ambiguity, in relation to 
firm inputs and outputs. In other words, it is not always clear which firm resources are of 
strategic value or why. Although counterintuitive, there are several reasons this situation 
might arise. 
First, a firm may not even be aware of the value of some assets it takes for granted, as they are 
a part of day-to-day operations. Thus, it is difficult for managers to identify valuable 
resources internally or be observed from externally. These so-called “invisible assets” include 
things like cooperation among managers, relationships with customers or company culture. 
(Itami and Roehl). A second source of causal ambiguity is that of resource complexity. 
Sometimes, it is not a single resource, but the efficient connections between multiple 
resources that provides an advantage. Dierickx and Cool called this “interconnectedness of 
asset stocks” and it can be very difficult to identify or imitate.  
2.3 Effectuation: Opportunity creation with available resources 
The resource based view begs the question: given a set of resources and capabilities, how can 
the entrepreneur best employ them to achieve their goals? Further, how are those goals shaped 
by the available resources? These questions are products “effectual” logic (Sarasvathy). 
Sarasvathy defines effectual reasoning in contrast to causational reasoning. Given a goal and a 
set of potential methods, causational logic teaches one to choose the optimal method to 
achieve said goal. So-called “creative causal reasoning” includes the additional ability to 
imagine new methods to achieve the given goal.  These modes are illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Casuational  Reasoning. (Figure adapted from Sarasvathy 2001) 
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Causational reasoning relies on certain assumptions from classical and neo-classical 
economics. Specifically, it assumes that markets and competitive imperfections are exogenous 
conditions which can be searched and selected from –separate from the actor - to identify an 
optimal path toward the given goal (Alvarez and Barney). While this kind of reasoning may 
be used for analyzing well-established industries, effectual logic is more appropriate for 
considering new and emerging markets. 
Effectual reasoning does not therefore start with a well-defined goal. “Instead, [effectuation] 
begins with a given set of means and allows goals to emerge contingently over time from the 
varied imagination and diverse aspirations of the founders and the people they interact with.” 
(Sarasvathy) The resources or means available to an entrepreneur typically fall into the 
categories: “Who I am”, “What I know” and “Whom I know” (Sarasvathy and Dew). This 
idea is illustrated in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5 Effectual Reasoning. (Figure adapted from Sarasvathy 2001) 
For example, returning to our hypothetical solar panel company, the causational analyst 
would try to identify the cheapest distribution channels amongst existing channels, find the 
segment in existing markets with the highest probability of return etc. and pursue those 
choices to maximize profit while reducing costs (a typical goal). Using effectual logic, the 
solar panel entrepreneur would instead start with their basic product and other resources 
available to them. She would leverage her existing network to try the panels in different 
contexts, at a relatively low risk. Perhaps they would be useful at bus stops for mobile phone 
charging? Or at large outdoor events? The effectual entrepreneur thus develops their product 
identity through a series of low cost iterations that leverage their existing resources to 
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eventually discover which market and distribution channels are the best fit, instead of 
deciding all of this beforehand. Sarasvathy also notes: “It is important to point out though that 
the same person can use both causal and effectual reasoning at different times depending on 
what the circumstances call for. In fact, the best entrepreneurs are capable of both and do use 
both modes well.”(Sarasvathy) 
The contrasting logics of causation and effectuation were further extended by Alvarez and 
Barney (2007) into alternative modes of entrepreneurial action, those of “discovery” and 
“creation”. In broad terms, discovery based entrepreneurship can be mapped to causal 
reasoning and creation based entrepreneurship can be mapped to effectual reasoning. They 
suggest that, “…rather than searching for a clear opportunity to be exploited, entrepreneurs 
creating opportunities might engage in an iterative learning process that ultimately could lead 
to the formation of an opportunity.” (Alvarez and Barney)  
They employ the poignant metaphor of a mountain to illustrate the differing modes of 
opportunity pursuit. The discovery oriented entrepreneur would find a new mountain that 
already existed and climb it. In contrast, the creation oriented entrepreneur would build a 
mountain to achieve new heights. Thus, the discovery mode is about primarily about 
searching for exogenous market opportunities to exploit, while the creation mode has nothing 
to do with searching for opportunities. It is an endogenous process based on quick and 
iterative feedback between the entrepreneur and their environment (Alvarez and Barney) 
(Sarasvathy and Dew).  
This leads us to the fourth and final proposition. 
Proposition 4: The cleantech-focused prototype-incubator 
ecosystem supports effectual processes of entrepreneurs. 
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3 Research Design and Methodology 
This study’s design and data collection methods were guided by the research question, so let 
us revisit it: 
Research Question:  
How can a cleantech-focused incubator-prototyping space ecosystem 
support the entrepreneurial processes of its members? 
3.1 Research Design 
After defining this question, I began my search for a facility that provided both typical 
business incubation services, as well as space for physical product development and testing, 
and preferably has a focus on cleantech. I initially speculated that a “maker space,” which also 
offered business incubation services, would be an ideal fit for this as a number of such spaces 
exist. However, it proved difficult to find such a space that also focused on cleantech.4  The 
search was therefore expanded to include business incubators that offer access to space for 
physical product development and testing for its members. Although it was possible to find a 
number of incubators with prototyping facilities attached, only one was found that had a focus 
on cleantech, Greentown. 
The case study method was chosen because of the qualitative “how” nature of the research 
question. Furthermore, at the time of writing, Greentown Labs is unique in the combination of 
resources that it offers to its members, making a single case study an appropriate research 
design choice (Yin).  Finally, an embedded case study was used with Greentown Labs 
member companies serving as the unit of analysis.  
The study was cross-sectional, due to the time restricted nature of a master’s thesis. The 
details of a recommended follow-up longitudinal study are given in the conclusion. 
Semi-structured interviews with Greentown Labs member companies were the primary 
method of data collection. Company interview subjects were promised anonymity to 
encourage more freely given answers. In addition, interviews with Greentown staff and other 
external subjects were conducted for data validation. As a qualitative study, data reliability 
and validity is of particular concern. The “subjective” nature of case studies often arouses 
4 It should also be noted that the “makers” and “maker spaces” that I initially reached out to were either 
indifferent or actively opposed to the idea of being the subject of academic research. As subject consent is a 
basic part of ethical research practices, and their cooperation often necessary for data collection, this line of 
inquiry was eventually abandoned.   
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concerns about observer biases and subject reflexivity. However, there are a number of best 
practices that can be employed to reduce these sources of error and I have made an effort to 
adhere to these as much as possible. In this section, I relate such measures taken, in the hope 
that in increases confidence in the results presented.  
3.1.1 Data Reliability 
Data reliability concerns the consistency of a measured result. To improve data reliability, the 
following applicable best practices were adhered to (Wilson): 
1. Multiple sources of evidence. The primary unit of analysis was member 
companies. To increase the reliability of data from the member companies, 13 
interviews with 13 different companies were conducted.  
2. A case study database. After the interviews were completed, the details of each 
interview were entered in a case study database. They were categorized by topic 
and relevance.  
3. A chain of evidence. With three exceptions, the interviews were recorded with the 
interviewee’s permission. For the interviews which could not be recorded, detailed 
notes were taken during and immediately following the interviews. The interview 
guide is found in the appendix. Due to privacy concerns, the interview transcripts 
are not published here. 
3.1.2 Data Validity 
Data validity concerns the relationship between a construct and its indicators. (Wilson). A 
study can have both external and internal validity.  External validity asks the question, “Can 
the findings be generalized to other settings?” As a unique case which is being explored and 
described in great detail, establishing external validity was not appropriate for this study 
(Wilson).  
Internal validity asks the question, “Does this measure what it is supposed to measure?” In 
this case, the primary indicators were the questions asked during the semi-structured 
interviews, as well as the supplemental data collection methods employed. The construct is, 
naturally, the research question. Ensuring internal validity in a case study can be difficult due 
to the number of variables. (Yin) 
To improve validity, Yin recommends that the researcher engage in data triangulation: finding 
multiple sources which support a given finding. In addition to the member company and staff 
21 
 
interviews, several external subjects who regularly interact with or influence Greentown Labs 
were also interviewed for this purpose. Furthermore, data from the existing web pages of all 
member companies was used to collect information on broader trends found in Greentown. In 
addition, I was able to examine physical artifact as well as engage in event participation. 
Finally, the Greentown NDA was examined. 
In addition to data triangulation, Mays and Pope (2000) recommend a number of additional 
measures to improve data validity. These were followed as much as possible, as applicable: 
1. Clear exposition of data collection and analysis. This may be found in the following 
sections. 
2. Reflexivity. This relates to sensitivity to the ways that researcher bias may influence 
the data collection. For this study, care was taken to ask neutral and open-ended 
interview questions that would allow the interviewees to expound freely upon the 
given subject. If needed, follow-on questions were used for clarification of points 
already volunteered by the interviewee. Reflexivity may also relate to bias from the 
subject of inquiry. Sensitivity to this was also taken into account when analyzing their 
responses. 
3. Fair dealing.  This requires employing various perspectives and data sources so that 
one viewpoint does not dominate a situation’s truth narrative.  It can be related to both 
methodological triangulation and data reliability measures, described earlier. To 
accomplish this, I interviewed as many subjects as possible both within and outside of 
Greentown, to get a clearer picture of how the ecosystem there does (or does not) 
support cleantech entrepreneurship. 
3.2 Data Collection 
A total of 7 working days was spent in Somerville at Greentown Labs (March 3, 2014 - 
March 11, 2014, inclusive), conducting interviews and collecting data employing the 
reliability and validation techniques described above. A final phone interview was conducted 
on March 12, 2014, the day of my departure. During this period, 22 interviews were 
conducted variously with Greentown member company employees or founders, Greentown 
staff or external subjects who related to Greentown in some capacity.  
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In addition to interviews, a number of supplementary primary data collection methods were 
employed. Photographs were not generally permitted in the prototyping space5, but I was 
given multiple tours and catalogued my observations afterwards. I was also given a tour of 
Artisan’s Asylum, and made some comparative notes. Next, although photographs were not 
allowed in the prototyping space, I was able to take some photographs of the Greentown 
coworking area, as well as some product prototypes which were brought to me outside of the 
prototyping space. In addition, the Greentown Labs member NDA, official website, and 
existing member company web pages were examined for data triangulation. Finally, I 
attended one of the networking events which was held while I was there and engaged in 
participant observation. 
  
5 I was permitted to take photographs of one particular area in the prototyping space. 
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4 A Brief History of Greentown 
This section presents an account of the evolution of Greentown. The skeleton of these events 
are outlined on the official website. This chronicle is based on that outline, with additional 
details pieced together to flesh out the narrative, from interviews with multiple staff and 
member companies. 
It began with four companies. 
Table 1 Greentown Labs founding companies 
Name Core Product (at time of founding) 
Coincident (now Embue) Smart HVAC hardware and control software 
Promethean Power Systems Solar powered refrigeration technology 
Oscomp Systems natural gas compressor 
Altaeros Energies High altitude wind turbines 
 
In 2009, Oscomp Systems (Oscomp) was renting a desk in a Boston coworking space. It was 
a typical coworking space, in that it catered to software companies and so only offered office 
space. However, Oscomp was starting to think about building their first compressor prototype 
and needed some space for that. 
Across the street from the coworking space, there was an old warehouse, which was about 
10,000 square feet6. Some of this space was rented by Promethean Power Systems 
(Promethean). In turn, Promethean was subletting some of their space in the warehouse to 
Coincident (now called Embue). Oscomp decided to leave the coworking space and rent some 
of the remaining area in the warehouse across the street. One of the founders of Oscomp and 
Altaeros Energies were taking a class together at MIT at this time. Through this connection, 
Oscomp learned that Altaeros was also looking for space and offered to sublet to them some 
of their space in the warehouse. 
After a period of months together in this space, the warehouse was sold. The new owners 
planned to tear it down so the four companies needed to find a new space. At this point, they 
decided to move forward as one, by trying to find a new space together. They wanted to pool 
their resources and so hopefully save some money because they knew that they all needed 
some kind of prototyping space and machine shop equipment. 
6 929 square meters 
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In their search process, they eventually found the old Greentown location in Boston. They 
liked the space, but it was much larger than what they needed, even all together. Of this 
situation, one of the founders told me in our interview, "Well, this space is awesome, we have 
this need for this kind of collocated office space and prototyping space. There's got to be a 
bunch of other companies around -- a bunch of other startups around... let's open this up to 
our energy network."  At that point, May 2011, they decided to incorporate Greentown Labs.  
Soon after moving in, they found their first sponsor, who provided free furniture. After 6 
months, five new cleantech companies had been added to the space. During this period, they 
also accrued a few additional sponsors. However, the founding companies did not do much to 
actively operate Greentown because they were busy running their own startup companies. 
They hypothesized that there were many more sponsors out there, as well grant money, but 
none of them had the time to pursue this. They knew that they needed someone who would be 
dedicated to it full time.  
Eventually, they became connected with Dr. Emily Reichert. She was so impressed by the 
Greentown community and vision that she was willing to come in without a salary, do some 
fundraising, find more sponsors and generally build a role for herself. Soon after joining, she 
was able to attract more sponsors, partners and member companies. By the time they moved 
to the Somerville location in Fall 2013, there were approximately 30 member companies and 
many new sponsors. Two staff members independently described Dr. Reichert’s work in 
growing Greentown in this period as “super human”. Greentown, it seemed, had found itself 
an institutional leader. 
In roughly this same period, they were told that the building they inhabited in Boston was 
being sold, and that they need to move. So, they began looking for a new space.  They wanted 
to stay in the original neighborhood, because it was the "Innovation District" of Boston and 
also convenient for many members. However, after their original building was sold, the area 
was no longer affordable. They met with the mayor's office in Cambridge, who wanted them 
to reside there. However, the available spaces in Cambridge were also too expensive and the 
city could not offer anything to mitigate this. After some searching, they found the space in 
Somerville. The city of Somerville was willing to provide a loan for the commercial build-out 
of the warehouse and other forms of official support. So, Greentown moved into their new 
(and hopefully more permanent) home in the fall of 2013. Since the move, they have acquired 
more sponsors and partners and, at the time of writing, have a total of 46 member companies. 
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Greentown’s mission can be found on their website: “We face a growing global population 
and the resources required to meet expanding demand is today's most pressing challenge. New 
ways of producing and consuming energy are necessary to address this problem while 
minimizing further damage to our environment… We enable entrepreneurs to solve big 
energy problems. Our mission is to enable a vibrant community of entrepreneurs to work on 
their visions and to provide access to the space, resources, and funding that allows their early-
stage companies thrive.” (greentownlabs.org) 
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5 Results 
In this chapter, I will first provide an overview of the “raw” data collected from the 
interviews. An analysis of these results is presented in the subsequent Discussion chapter. 
5.1 Interview Data 
In total, 22 interviews were conducted. These were divided into three categories:  
• Greentown member companies  
• Greentown staff 
• External subjects 
A separate set of guiding questions was followed when conducting the semi-structured 
interviews with members of each group. The details of these guides may be found in the 
appendix. In this section, I will present the aggregated results from each of these groups. 
5.1.1 Greentown Companies 
At the time of the research trip, a total of 41 companies were present in Greentown; at the 
time of writing, there are 46. It was possible to obtain in-person interviews with twelve 
current member companies, along with one former member company. The interviewees were 
promised anonymity, to encourage more freely given answers. Table 2 presents a brief 
overview of the interviews. Each session was recorded unless otherwise noted. 
 
Table 2- Overview of interviewed companies lifespan and time in Greentown to date 
Company 
ID 
Interviewee – 
(co-)founder or 
employee? 
Age of 
company at 
time of 
interview 
Length of time 
in Greentown 
at time of 
interview 
A Co – founder 3 years Since founding 
B Employee 2 years 14 months 
C Co-founder 4 years Since founding 
D Employee 10 months Unclear 
E Founder 4 years Since founding 
F Co-founder 2 years 7 months 
G Founder  13 months 12 months 
H Co-founder 1 year 7 months 
I Employee 4 years 1 month 
J7 Founder 3 years 2 years 
K Founder 3 years 1 year 
L Employee 10 months 5 months 
M Co-founder 2 years 5 months8 
7 This interview happened over the course of two separate sessions. These sessions were not recorded, at the 
interviewee’s request. 
8 Company M had recently left Greentown, at the time of the interview. 
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Three of the companies interviewed were present in Greentown “since founding”. This means 
that the company joined at the time of their founding, and thus went through all development 
stages to date with Greentown.  
Hardware companies received the most attention, to understand how they used the 
prototyping space resource and so address the research question. However, several non-
hardware companies were interviewed as well. Their perspective was useful in isolating the 
resources which are of perceived value to cleantech companies in general. The companies 
interviewed thus had a diverse range of products and services. The following table 
summarizes the general product type for each company. I have omitted product descriptions 
to preserve the anonymity of the interview subjects. 
Table 3 Overview of company products 
Company 
ID 
Hardware, software 
or business model 
innovation 
Uses 
prototyping 
space? 
A Hardware yes 
B Hardware yes 
C Hardware yes 
D Hardware yes 
E Hardware yes 
F Hardware yes 
G Hardware yes 
H Hardware yes 
I Hardware yes 
J Hardware yes 
K Hardware/ 
Software 
no 
L Software No 
M Business model no 
 
5.1.2 Greentown staff 
At the time of the research trip, Greentown had four full-time staff positions. It was possible 
to obtain interviews with each of these: 
• Executive Director 
• Executive Vice President 
• Operations Manager 
• Accounts Manager 
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Since the research trip, three more full-time staff members have been hired. The original 
Accounts Manager has also moved on to work full time for one of the member companies. So, 
the total staff has effectively increased by 2 members since the original research trip. 
 
5.1.3 External subjects 
To validate or “triangulate” the results from the internal Greentown interviews, in accordance 
with the best practices suggested by Wilson (2010) and Yin (2013), several external actors 
were interviewed. These subjects interact with or perceive Greentown in various ways, and 
are not directly part of a member company (with arguably one exception), or on the staff.  
Table 4 Overview of external interview subjects 
Interviewee 
Role / ID 
Relation to Greentown 
startup 
consultant  
The subject has an engineering Ph.D. and provides coaching and consulting 
services to entrepreneurs in the Boston area. She has significant experience 
working with cleantech startup companies, although none from Greentown. 
engineering 
consultant 
The subject has an engineering Ph.D. and prior cleantech industry experience. 
He has a desk at Artisan’s Asylum and has done contract engineering work 
with several of the companies in Greentown. 
venture 
capitalist 
The subject is a partner at a Boston based venture capital firm that specializes 
in cleantech. He offered insight on venture capital’s role in cleantech.  He is 
aware of Greentown, but his office has not yet invested in any companies 
there. This will addressed in more detail in the discussion section. 
angel 
investor 
The subject has invested in several Greentown companies. He also provides 
consulting work for some companies and has an “investor desk” at Greentown 
which he uses 2-3 days per week.  
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6 Discussion 
In this chapter, I present the results of the study thematically, by how they relate to each 
proposition. The evidential support, for or against each proposition, is weighed and 
considered. Therefore, let us briefly review the research question and proposition before 
proceeding to their analysis.   
Research Question:  
How can a cleantech-focused incubator-prototyping space ecosystem 
support the entrepreneurial processes of its members? 
6.1 Propositions: 
Proposition 1: A cleantech-focused incubator can act as a 
convergence point for industry relevant input streams. 
Proposition 2: A cleantech-focused incubator can provide member 
companies access to relevant strategic resources.  
Proposition 3: The combination of incubator and prototyping space 
facilitates a culture of sharing that helps members accelerate each 
other’s businesses. 
Proposition 4: The cleantech-focused prototype-incubator ecosystem 
supports effectual processes of entrepreneurs.  
 
6.2 External Resource Input Streams 
The goal of this study is to explore how the combination of resources found in Greentown 
Labs support its member’s cleantech entrepreneurial activities. However, many of the 
resources found within Greentown originated outside. The boundary between Greentown and 
the surrounding environment is murky at times. It is, after all, one part of a larger community 
with which it regularly interacts and mutually influences. These external resources may thus 
be modeled as input streams, which converge at and feed into Greentown.  
This leads us to the first proposition. 
Proposition 1: A cleantech-focused incubator can act as a 
convergence point for industry relevant input streams. 
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To explore this proposition further, it will be helpful to define Greentown’s broader context 
and finally take an account of how companies relate to them. It should be emphasized here 
again that it was not possible to interview every company at Greentown. It was similarly not 
possible to conduct a comprehensive survey. The results presented in this section are 
compiled from the 13 member company interviews, as well as information provided on 
existing company websites. There are likely other broader community resource input streams 
and interactions, which are not documented here. That being said, let the reader be forewarned 
that this section is quite data-rich. It may require some small stamina to read, but trust that 
each detail is chosen with care and necessary to support the larger conclusion. 
6.2.1 Context 
Let us first get a bird’s eye view of the situation, before considering each aspect in detail. The 
broader community has several different pillars that each provide their own resource input 
stream. The term “input streams” is intentionally chosen over that of “resources” in this 
proposition, to underscore their flowing modality (in the spirit of Dierickx and Cool’s bathtub 
metaphor (Dierickx and Cool)). Namely, they are not static entities that offer single or one-
time assets, but provide flowing streams of different types of resources. In this section, I will 
review these generally and, in the following section, will present how these input streams are 
used by the member companies as well as Greentown itself. 
 
Figure 6 Resource input streams 
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6.2.1.1 A patchwork quilt: local incubators , accelerators and related networks 
There is an abundance of local business accelerators and incubators to be found in the greater 
Boston area. These have provided a combination of seed funding, space or mentoring to 
several member companies, both prior to and during their tenure at Greentown.  Let us take a 
look at this larger network in more detail. 
The NBIA has 15 business incubators registered in the state of Massachusetts (Greentown 
Labs is one). Of the remaining 14, 12 can be found in the greater Boston area, or within one 
hour of driving from Greentown. These local incubators range in focus from general to 
biomedical to cleantech. A complete list of these can be found in the appendix. NBIA 
members get professional development services, access to world’s largest network of business 
incubators (via a ListServ and directory access), a voice in the incubation industry with 
representative advocates to policymakers, recognition opportunities (i.e. awards), and 
discounted access to events and publications from NBIA partners. 
Greentown is also part of the Association of Cleantech Incubators of New England 
(ACTION) network, which contains 14 cleantech incubators in total.9 ACTION members are 
provided with administrative support, up to date industry best practices documentation, lead 
generation, mentor matching as well connection services between entrepreneurs and investors. 
ACTION membership “is open to non-profit organizations10 that are dedicated to accelerating 
the success of early-stage companies engaged in the development of technology, products, or 
services for the cleantech industry.” (actionnewengland.org) 
In addition to the ACTION network, Greentown itself, as well as a number of member 
companies, belong to New England Clean Energy Council (NECEC). From their website, 
“NECEC is a regional non-profit organization representing clean energy companies and 
entrepreneurs throughout New England and the Northeast through programs and initiatives 
that help clean energy businesses at all stages of development to access the resources they 
need to grow.” (cleanenergycouncil.org). Members of the NECEC receive a long list of 
tangible and intangible benefits. The complete list may be found in the appendix; particularly 
significant benefits include group insurance rates on health and property/casualty insurance, 
discounts to partner events and services, networking opportunities and marketing promotion. 
9 Three of these incubators are in Europe, so it appears to have expanded beyond the originally conceived scope 
when the network was named.  
10 Greentown is not a non-profit, but were able to join ACTION anyway. 
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Besides other business incubators and related networks, there is a multitude of accelerator 
programs in the area which provide mentorship and (sometimes) seed funding to participants. 
A complete list of all such programs that have at least one graduating company in Greentown 
may be found in the appendix. The following accelerator programs have multiple graduates 
feeding into Greentown: 
Clean Tech Open Northeast - The Cleantech Open is a national accelerator program that is 
divided into regions. The Northeast region covers Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. The 
program is designed to “foster entrepreneurs with ideas to solve our greatest environmental 
and energy challenges. Through our annual business competition and accelerator program we 
use mentoring, training, and coaching to connect cleantech startups with the people and 
resources that will accelerate their success, as well as a national platform for media and public 
visibility.” (northeast.cleantechopen.com) Finalists in the Clean Tech Open Northeast are also 
given subsidized desk rent at Greentown for 4 months. 
MIT Clean Energy Prize (CEP) – This is a multi-stage business competition for cleantech-
focused companies. At least half of the team must be active students at the time of application 
(though not necessarily at MIT). The program structure has evolved on an annual basis since 
its launch in 2011, but it has consistently provided mentorship to the participants who make it 
past the initial selection phase. Semi-finalist and finalists are additionally awarded cash 
prizes, media recognition, networking opportunities and other resources. One of the 
interviewed companies was a semi-finalist in 2012. 
Mass Challenge – The Mass Challenge mission is “To catalyze a startup renaissance.” 
Selected startups participate in an intensive four month accelerator program which provides a 
combination of shared office space, matched mentors, in-kind services, networking 
opportunities and other resources. For hardware companies, they also have a hardware lab. 
The selected startups are placed into one of the following categories: Energy / Cleantech, 
General, Healthcare / Life Sciences, High Tech, and Social Impact. At the end of the 
accelerator program, several finalist companies are selected and awarded cash prizes. Several 
Greentown companies have been Mass Challenge semi-finalist accelerator participants in the 
Energy / Cleantech category; a smaller number of those have also been selected as final round 
prize winners. 
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TechStars – This highly competitive accelerator program provides seed funding, intensive 
mentorship for 90 days, and access to its network in exchange of 7-10% equity in a company. 
This program has expanded to several cities around the US11, one of which is Boston. Several 
TechStars graduate companies have found their way to Greentown. 
A survey of awards from all the member companies is more illuminating on the extent to 
which Greentown as a whole benefits from this input stream. Therefore, Table 5 presents the 
list of accelerator programs that at least two Greentown companies have participated in. A 
more complete list of accelerators and other funding sources may be found in the appendix. 
This information was collected from both my interview subjects and from the web pages of 
member companies I was not able to interview. It should be noted that not all companies have 
web pages or obviously advertised awards, so this list is not comprehensive. Finally, some 
companies have received two or more prizes. Given that, the numbers still indicates a 
significant influx of money and resources from these other sources. 
Table 5 Feeder Accelerators 
Accelerator Name Number of Greentown Companies 
that have participated 
Mass Challenge 5 
CleanTech Open 6 
TechStars 3 
MIT Clean Energy Prize 8 
 
6.2.1.2 A university town 
The Boston metropolitan area has 60 accredited higher education institutes. Of these, 18 
primarily grant bachelor and master’s degrees, 9 are research universities which grant degrees 
through the doctoral level, 26 are special-focus institutions (e.g. business schools), as well as 
5 junior colleges. A map of the larger schools is the Boston area is shown in Figure 7. 
Collectively, these schools enroll approximately 250,000 students each year . 
Further research into potential spillover effects of this dense cluster of schools to the local 
startup community in general – or, cleantech in particular - is recommended. For the purposes 
of this study however, it is merely observed that many of the founders and employees at 
Greentown companies and Greentown staff are students or recent graduates from these local 
institutions. It therefore constitutes one strategic resource input stream.  
11 And one in London. 
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Figure 7 Boston area schools (house.gov/capuano) 
Table 6 presents the educational backgrounds of the interview subjects. The total is greater 
than 13 because I have included the backgrounds of co-founders, when available. Unlike 
previous accelerator award data, this type of information is not as easily available on websites 
so I have restricted it to the interview subjects. Again, they have been aggregated to preserve 
anonymity. 
Table 6 Feeder Schools (interviewed companies only) 
School Number of founders 
or employees 
Babson College 3 
UC Berkley 1 
Duke 2 
Harvard 2 
MIT 9 
UMass Amherst 4 
With the exception of Berkley and Duke, the founders and employees of the interviewed 
companies came from local schools. 
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Finally, the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center (MassCEC) offers a program for connecting 
local students to clean energy startups through subsidized internships. The program “focuses 
on enhancing the talent pipeline for Massachusetts companies engaged in the clean energy 
industry.” (ma.cleanenergyeducation.org) During different periods throughout the year, the 
MassCEC provides local cleantech firms with stipends of up to $12 per hour, for up to 10 
consecutive weeks, for each full-time intern. With a cap of $4,800 per intern, this amounts to 
40 hours per week of subsidized labor for local cleantech companies (masscec.com). 
Greentown’s staff, as well have two of the interviewed companies, had taken advantage of 
this program. 
6.2.1.3 The government 
The third resource input stream comes from the government at the city, state and federal level. 
Greentown relocated to its current location, in the city of Somerville, in October 2013. The 
Somerville city government has provided support in a number of ways leading up to and since 
the move, and this support is partially responsible for Greentown’s decision to relocate there. 
Among other resources, the city of Somerville was willing to provide a loan for the 
commercial build out of the warehouse location. The walls, HVAC system, and design were 
all custom built to meet Greentown’s needs. In addition, the city has partnered with a few 
member companies to pilot their products at city facilities. On a less formal basis, but still 
arguably significant, the mayor reportedly visits Greentown on a semi-regular basis “just to 
say hi” (Operations Director). 
Somerville is found in the state of Massachusetts. The MassCEC was mentioned briefly in 
connection to its student intern program. However, the intern program is one of the many 
initiatives by the MassCEC that affects Greentown and the larger Massachusetts cleantech 
community. The MassCEC was formed in 2009 under the leadership of the state governor at 
the time, Deval Patrick, and is funded through the Massachusetts Renewable Energy Trust 
Fund (Laws). It also has extensive private industry partnerships and networks that are 
leveraged to pursue its mission: 
With economic growth in mind, MassCEC invests in early-stage clean energy 
companies helping them to bring ideas to the marketplace. MassCEC supports 
responsibly sited renewable energy projects and provides municipalities, 
homeowners and businesses with the tools needed to finance and locate renewable 
energy projects like wind and solar. MassCEC also develops programs to build a 
strong clean energy workforce – including a successful statewide internship program 
– to give the clean energy generation the skills to compete for jobs in this emerging 
space. (masscec.com) 
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It is finally worth noting that the CEO of MassCEC is also a Board member at Greentown, at 
the time of writing. 
On the national level, a number of member companies have received funding through the 
Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program. Each federal agency with an R&D 
budget above $100 million has a mandate to allocate 2.8% of that budget to small business 
through the SBIR program. This is designed to encourage “domestic small businesses to 
engage in Federal Research/Research and Development (R/R&D) that has the potential for 
commercialization.” (sbir.gov) A list of all participating agencies may be found in the 
appendix.  
The awards are given in up to three phases. Phase I awards are designed to establish technical 
feasibility and merit of an idea. They do not typically exceed $150,000 or last more than 6 
months.  Phase II awards are continuations of the efforts initiated in Phase I and are based on 
the results therein. They are designed to bring the Phase I efforts to maturity. These awards do 
not exceed $1,000,000 or last more than 2 years.  Phase III awards are for supporting small 
businesses to pursue commercialization of the technology from the Phase I/II R&D efforts. 
Phase III awards are not funded by the SBIR program, but may come from federal agencies 
(or private parties) interested in using the products or services developed through the Phase 
I/II R&D efforts. (sbir.gov) 
The National Science Foundation (NSF) also grants awards independent of its SBIR program. 
Within Greentown, SBIR phase I and II awards from the NSF and the Department of Energy 
(DOE), as well as independent NSF grants were found in several companies. Table 7 presents 
the totals of companies in Greentown that have received these government sponsored awards. 
Again, this data was aggregated from the companies I interviewed as well as the websites of 
companies I could not interview. It is subject to the same limitations as the accelerator feeder 
table because not all companies have websites or advertise their awards. 
Table 7 Feeder Government Awards 
Award Name Number of companies received  
MassCEC 5 
SBIR Phase I 4 
SBIR Phase II 4 
NSF Grant 1 
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6.2.1.4 The resource stream that wasn’t: Venture Capital  
The recent history of venture capital (VC) in cleantech has had an impact on Greentown’s 
development and will be reviewed in the following section. 
VC has played a major role in the growth of several new technology-based industries in recent 
decades, particularly those which have been perceived as too risky by banks and other 
traditional business funding avenues. VC firms have helped to bring mobile sector 
innovations, for example, into the world and created new markets in the process. It would 
therefore seem logical that cleantech, as potentially the next “megatrend” would be attractive 
to VCs. Or, in the current framework, one might guess that VC would provide another 
significant input stream. In fact, however, this is not the case. Cleantech startups looking to 
fund their growth stage and navigate the “valley of death” should not count on VC. 
(Pitchbook)  (Day).  
Conspicuous by its absence, the vacuum left by VC has had its own effect on the evolution of 
Greentown.  I will now explore this parallel history, from the past decade or so. There are 
many possible reasons for this somewhat counterintuitive trajectory of VC in cleantech. In an 
interview with a VC firm partner that invests in cleantech, the following narrative emerged 
(paraphrased for brevity and clarity):  
After the dot-com bubble burst, VC firms were looking to invest their funds in non-internet 
related technologies, which were then deemed too risky. Thus, they turned their eyes toward 
cleantech companies in the early to mid-2000’s, which were perceived favorably compared to 
software companies for a time because of they were “rooted in reality.” However, many of 
these investments did poorly.   
First, the VC firms that had previously specialized in software or internet technology were ill 
equipped to understand the needs of these hardware based cleantech companies, particularly 
in terms of the longer research and product development lifecycles. In essence, there was a 
drastic misalignment of expectations. Second, due greatly in part to this lack of 
understanding, a significant portion of these investments were simply bad choices from a VC 
perspective, which is typically looking for an x-multiple exit in a relatively short period of 
time (2-5 years). This is because these earlier cleantech ventures – largely in solar and 
biofuels – amounted to commodity (electricity) investments. But, this equivalence was not 
understood at the time, when enthusiasm for renewable energy technology was high.  
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And so, the story ends somewhat predictably. Once the VC community realized that those 
early investments were basically commodities that would have to compete against entrenched 
low cost suppliers (i.e., carbon based energy sources like coal or natural gas), they started to 
vigorously back-peddle. This turnabout happened roughly 2009-2011. Since then, very few 
VC offices will even take meetings with companies that brand themselves as “cleantech.” 
This is true, even if the core product is not related to electricity, but offers a different and 
more attractive value proposition. The mainstream VC firms may invest in companies that 
incidentally promote a sustainable earth but not, generally speaking, as their primary agenda. 
(Venture Capitalist).  
 
Figure 8 VC cleantech dealflow since 2004 (Pitchbook) 
 
The above figure illustrates the expected dropoff in 2008 reflecting larger market trends at the 
time. The precipitous drop from 2011 onward corroborates the VC interview subject’s 
account. It is also worth noting that there has been a shift from early stage to late stage 
investment within existing deals.  
6.2.2 A convergence point 
The scene has been set, so let us move on to the case itself.  
In the previous section, I described the different kinds of external inputs that feed a continual 
stream of resources into Greentown.  These come from network membership benefits and 
local accelerator programs and competitions, as well as local universities and government 
support. For this study, I have simply observed that these resource streams exist, and 
documented them to the extent that I was able. 
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These findings are borne out by my interview the Executive Director Dr. Reichert, when 
discussing their review process for member applicants. The first criteria they consider is 
whether the company has a cleantech focus. After that: 
The other things that I particularly look for is the realism of their business models. I know 
that I am not an expert in every single technology out there and neither are my board 
members who review these applications. So what we do is rely on outside sources, third party 
sources, to review these applications for us in this way.  We look for companies that have 
already been through accelerator programs, who have already won contests, who have 
already somehow shown to a bunch of investors that they‘re worth their salt. And so, we get a 
lot of graduates from accelerator programs and that’s kind of the pickings that we look to 
bring in here. 
… 
The final thing is just that we look for is the ability to pay. I mean, these companies all need to 
have some source of external funding, right, because we don’t provide funding. They have to 
pay rent to be here. (Reichert) 
I submit that external resource input streams should be distinguished from internally provided 
strategic resources (which will be discussed in the next section). These streams are 
independent of Greentown and would be redirected elsewhere if Greentown did not exist; 
outside cleantech companies also benefit from them. Thus, when trying to answer a question 
like “Does an incubator help companies succeed and, if so, how?”, it is problematic factoring 
these kinds of resources into the analysis, because they exist ex ante. Some of these resources 
may well provide a strategic advantage to member companies when considered within the 
traditional RBV framework, but they are not intrinsic or sourced from Greentown. The 
directionality of these resource vectors is significant because if it is not considered, one is at 
risk of making a tautology along the lines of “the incubator offers resources because resources 
are offered to incubator.” 
At the same time, there is a sense of institutional mass about Greentown, which seems to draw 
these resources into its orbit. Greentown does not provide the inputs itself, but they do 
contribute to the overall resource density of the community, and this is likely a factor in 
member company performance. Thus, when asking a question like “How can a given 
incubator’s success be replicated?” it is not sufficient to simply consider the internally 
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provided resources, but also these external resource input streams. This is a topic worthy of 
future investigation. 
6.3 Internal Strategic Resources 
Proposition 2: A cleantech-focused incubator can provide member 
companies access to relevant strategic resources.  
In the previous section, we considered resources which flow into Greentown. In this section, I 
will discuss the different internal resources made available to Greentown member companies 
and how this affects them.  
6.3.1 Physical space and location 
As posited in the introduction, the combination of office space and prototyping space is 
attractive to cleantech companies with a physical product. Greentown rents desks out to 
member companies for $400 per month. The terms are flexible, so the companies are not 
obligated to stay for one or two-year leases, which is typical in many office spaces. As the 
desks are large, companies can choose to seat two people at one desk for an addition $200 for 
the second person (i.e., $300 per person). The desk pricing is competitive with other 
coworking spaces in the area.  Here is a picture of one part of the coworking desk area.  
 
Figure 9 Greentown  coworking area 
The picture was taken early in the day, so many of the Greentown inhabitants were not 
present yet and others were in the prototyping area. There are also desks to the left and right 
which are not captured in this photo. Due to intellectual property concerns, photos are not 
generally permitted in the prototyping area. 
In addition to the desk space, companies have the option of renting area in the prototyping 
facility. The doors to the prototyping area may be seen in the background of the above figure. 
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Prototyping space is rented out by the square foot, so each company has their own separate 
area. However, there was also a set of shared machine shop tools found there, which were 
donated by one of the companies and available for general use.  The minimum area for rent is 
100 square feet12 for $3/square foot. So, the minimum that a company with prototyping space 
could pay per month is $700 ($400 for the desk plus $300 for the prototyping area).  
Ten out of the eleven hardware companies interviewed used the prototyping space. The one 
exception had minimal hardware needs and is able to do the work easily from his home, so 
cannot justify the cost of paying for prototyping space. 
6.3.1.1 Why Greentown? 
When asked why a company joined Greentown, three trends emerged: 
Group I: Looking for a prototyping space, period. These companies had a product idea and 
had decided to build their first prototype. However, they needed a place for it. So, these 
companies began looking for spaces which met their needs and found Greentown. 
Group II: Looking for a better prototyping space. These companies had started building 
prototypes in other locations, but found it difficult and were looking for a better solution. 
Company G’s comment encompassed this sentiment well: "My girlfriend was ready to kick 
me out... I had power tools going on the back deck and my neighbors weren't too happy..." 
(Company G). 
Group III: Came to Greentown came because of an award, stayed for the community. 
Several of the interviewed companies came into Greentown after receiving an award.  
Company F’s account was closely echoed in those in this group:  
“Those who were in the semifinals of the Cleantech Open got subsidized space in incubators 
in the New England region, mainly Greentown. So, we got this award along with a few other 
companies… So, that’s how we came to learn about Greentown. And, we were like ‘OK great, 
that’s basically four months of almost free spacing,’ It was 75% subsidized rent. Then we 
came here and said ‘Wow this is actually an amazing place!’ And, more importantly, it is all 
hardware guys, so I couldn’t think of a better community to grow our business.”(Company F) 
At the time of the interview, Company D had just been accepted and started participation in a 
TechStars class. “The shop space for us in this period has been critical. It will continue to be 
12 9.2 square meters 
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just because our prototyping needs… [TechStars] has just desks. They’re historically about 
web IT software stuff, and are just now moving into hardware.” (Company D) 
6.3.1.2 Some examples of prototype space usage 
As mentioned in the methodology, the interviewed companies were promised anonymity for 
this study. Surprisingly, the majority of interview subjects independently offered that they 
would not mind being identified. I have nonetheless attempted to preserve anonymity as much 
as possible for the sake of the few companies which did not make such an offer. 
However, in the case where photographs are helpful for the discussion and the company had 
already volunteered to be identified, anonymity is no longer practical. There were two 
Greentown companies that I will therefore identify because the specific details of their usage 
of the prototyping space are interesting and visually compelling. These companies are Grove 
Labs (Grove) and Sistine Solar (Sistine). 
Grove develops technology to monitor and control growing environments so that they can 
optimize the environmental variables, like light and air temperature, for plants. The founder 
kindly allowed me to take a picture of their Grove Urban Research Farm (GURF) where they 
develop and test their technology. 
 
Figure 10 The Grove Urban Research Farm (GURF) 
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The general prototyping space is open, and the companies do not have walls between them as 
seen in the GURF, much like in the coworking area. However, Grove needed to be able to 
more reliably control the temperature and humidity conditions for their research so they built 
the GURF. When discussing this, I asked “What would you be doing if you were not in 
Greentown?” Grove founder Jamie Byron said, “We wouldn’t have built anything like that or 
even had the idea to do that if we hadn’t had access to space.” Of course, it is impossible to 
say with certainty what Grove would have done without Greentown, but the response supports 
the proposition that the space is valuable resource. 
Sistine is another company which generously allowed me to take a photo of their product. 
Sistine belongs both in Group I and Group III, in their motivation for joining Greentown. That 
is, they had simultaneously won an award which gave them subsidized access and had 
reached the point where they were going to look for prototyping space anyway. Therefore, a 
fortuitous combination of timing and events led them to Greentown. In the prototyping space, 
they have developed their patent-pending colored solar tiles shown in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11 Sistine Solar Tiles 
These tiles do not achieve maximum efficiency because they are colored instead of black. 
However, the value proposition of Sistine is that, by  making solar technology more 
aesthetically pleasing – the tiles can be interlocked to form patterns – this will increase its 
visibility in public spaces and usage overall. They recently launched a successful Kickstarter 
campaign to build a “parklet13” using the tiles, in partnership with a local underserved youth 
organization.  
13 A parklet is an area, typically one or two parking spaces large, that provides a mini-park on an urban street. 
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6.3.1.3 On the Old Space and the New 
Of the companies interviewed, several had experienced both the old Boston location as well 
as the new Somerville one. When asked to compare spaces, they all uniformly preferred the 
new space. When asked why, the following reasons consistently emerged:  
1. There was no division between the prototyping area and office space in the old 
Boston location, so when the shop machines were running, the noise interfered 
with office work. In the new space, the prototyping area is in the same building, 
but separated with a wall and door and this is preferred.  
2. The old space did not have air conditioning in the summer. As Boston summers 
can be quite hot and humid, it was uncomfortable and made working difficult. The 
new space has a comprehensive HVAC system which allows for consistent 
temperature control and is preferred. 
The Company E and Company K interview subjects both also noted that the new space is 
“more professional”. The meeting rooms make it easier for them to set up meetings with 
customers. The Company K founder mentioned further that he liked having 24/7 access to the 
facility. Because many of the companies have other jobs (himself included), it is important 
that members can come to the space on evening and weekends. 
However, it also emerged that the new location greatly increases the travel time for Embue, 
one of the original companies. Their founder and employees no longer come regularly to the 
new Greentown location, although they are still considered a member company. On a related 
note, in order to keep his own commute time, the founder of Company A actually moved 
when Greentown changed locations (Company A). 
6.3.2 Sponsor-based resources 
Greentown self-identifies as a coworking space that offers some member services, not an 
incubator (greentownlabs.org). It is unclear why this was the case, as they more closely 
resemble a traditional business incubator, as described previously. I suspect this distinction 
may be due an awareness of the confusion surrounding the terms ‘incubator’ and 
‘accelerator’, and they wish to make it clear that they are not an accelerator. 
Most of the member services are provided by Greentown sponsors. These are distinguished 
from the input stream resources discussed in the previous chapter for two reasons. First, they 
only exist because Greentown’s team took the initiative to make them available to their 
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members. Thus, the second distinction between the independent input streams and sponsor 
based resources is that only member companies are able to leverage them.  
These sponsor companies provide a combination of capital and in-kind resources. The 
tangible resources that are available to member companies through these sponsors are as 
follows: 
Software License Keys 
The following companies provide software license keys to member companies: MathWorks, 
AutoDesk, SolidWorks and National Instruments. These products normally cost their buyers 
hundreds or even thousands of dollars for a single license key. So, this represents a significant 
capital resource for companies which use the software packages in their core product research 
and development processes. Three of the companies interviewed (B, E and G) used some of 
these licenses. 
Legal Services 
There are two sponsor law firms, Foley Hoag and Wolf Greenfield, that each offer up to X 
thousand dollars of legal consulting to every member firm. Like the software licenses, this is a 
significant resource for early stage companies without much cash flow who nonetheless 
require expensive legal services. However, only one of the companies interviewed took 
advantage of this service. 
Two interviewed companies were not aware that these legal sponsor services existed (this was 
discovered when discussing the issue of being able to afford legal consulting as a startup). 
Another company said that they “did not want to be cheap when it came to [their] IP.” This 
company, which also had SBIR funding, decided to look for the best law firm they could find 
that met their needs. Companies D and H said that their legal needs had been met by the 
accelerator they participated in prior to joining Greentown, when they were incorporated. 
Neither had needed additional legal services since joining. 
Marketing services 
The HB Agency is a marketing and branding sponsor agency that comes in once a week for 
office hours. During this time, members can ask them marketing and branding related 
questions and also receive advice. I was not able to interview any companies which took 
advantage of this service; however, they are also helping Greentown itself with marketing and 
branding. 
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Companies A, K, J all said that their companies were mature enough that the legal and 
marketing services offered by the sponsors were not of interest to them. Company K was the 
founder’s third company, so he added that he was glad the resources were available to the 
earlier stage companies, particularly the ones with younger founders. 
Other tangible resources from sponsors 
As mentioned briefly before, the city of Somerville provided a subsidized loan for the build 
out of the warehouse location. Companies F and G were able to meet the mayor of Somerville 
when he came for a visit. As a result of this meeting, the city is piloting Company G’s 
product. 
Digital Lumens gave discounts on their lights, which turn on and off depending on whether 
people are present. These save energy and align with Greentown’s missiong. However, they 
are also quite expensive and would not have been available to Greentown without the 
sponsorship.  
In the Greentown canteen, there is a “sponsor wall” where the logos of the different sponsors 
are prominently displayed. It can be seen that they are divided into tiers – cleverly named 
“Terawatt”, “Gigawatt”, “Megawatt” and “Kilowatt” - which are used to distinguish the level 
of support offered. The companies noted on the wall which were not previously discussed 
either offered cash support or “partnership opportunities.”  
 
Figure 12 The sponsor wall and event space 
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6.3.3 Networking and Events 
The canteen converts into an event space several times a month. Greentown sponsors internal 
events there, in addition to renting out or donating the space for related external activities. 
Each month, Greentown hosts an event called the “Energy Bar.” This is a themed event that is 
open to the public and paid for by a different sponsor each time. Some past themes include the 
Olympics (the decoration made for this can still be seen hanging in Figure 12) and a pitch 
contest, with a transportation focus. On average, around 150 people attend (Accounts 
Manager). It is usually a combination of member companies, entrepreneurs in the area, people 
interested in cleantech, as well as some of the sponsors. 
External events hosted in the space include the cleantech intern fair and the “Boston 
CleanWeb Hackathon”. This occurs annually and “is a two-day prize competition to 
demonstrate the impact of applying information technologies to energy and resource 
constraints, known as the cleanweb. Entrepreneurs, developers, designers, and business 
professionals create web and mobile IT applications to solve some of our biggest energy and 
sustainability problems.” (cleanwebhackathon.com) One of the Greentown member 
companies interviewed was conceived and founded at a previous year’s Cleanweb Hackathon. 
The cleantech intern fair is used to connect applicants with member companies for 
participation in the MassCEC intern program described earlier. Participation in this program 
is not exclusive to Greentown companies. However, since so many companies are found 
there, it was a logical place to host the event. One of the companies interviewed said that they 
found an intern at this event. 
When conducting my semi-structured interview with Company B, I asked, “Could you tell me 
about some of the support you received from the larger community?” They began by 
describing some awards and they had received (Cleantech Open and MassCEC), but followed 
up with this insight:   
“All these awards, it’s not just the monetary value, but also this network it opens up. Even 
with Greentown. I mean, we get so much traffic here with investors and customers, with 
people that want to talk with us and, you know, we don’t need to do any additional work on 
our part. Like, we’re here and then we’ll hear either through emails, or Liz or Emily will say 
‘Hey can you share about your company? This company is interested in learning about you.’ 
So, they’re doing kind of a lot of the publicity and marketing for us.” (Company B) 
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In my interview with Company E, the subject revealed that they had experienced some 
investor introductions by virtue of being part of Greentown. “Often times, if a company is 
meeting with a prospective investor, they’ll give them a tour and so we’ve met some of 
[Company A]’s and [Company C]’s investors and vice versa.” (Company E) 
It seems that Greentown membership has, for some companies at least, provided a valuable 
network access to investors (although we will later see that this access has not borne any fruit 
as of yet).  
6.3.4 VRIO Perspective Applied 
Let us briefly recall the four main types of strategic resources: financial capital, physical 
capital, human capital and organizational capital (Barney Gaining and Sustaining 
Competitive Advantage).   
In this chapter, we have also seen that the combination of desk and prototyping space offered 
by Greentown is a valuable and rare physical resource for cleantech companies. It is not 
inimitable – there are several such combination spaces in the Boston area alone – but it is the 
only one with a focus on cleantech. Thus, in addition to access to the external networks, it 
provides a valuable internal network as well. This is a kind of valuable and rare 
organizational capital available to member companies. 
The services offered by the Greentown sponsors are also of significant financial value to the 
member companies. Although these are not rare or inimitable, they may still offer somewhat 
of a competitive advantage because non-Greentown companies will face higher cost barriers 
to attaining them while still possibly having typical startup cash flow issues. 
The notion of human capital is not applicable for Greentown, because each member company 
supplies their own talent. In fact, the companies sign an agreement not to “poach” other 
company’s employees when they join. However, as seen in the Greentown history chapter, 
Dr. Reichert may perhaps be considered an institutional leader, whose presence has been a 
benefit to the member companies and thus represents a valuable, rare and inimitable resource. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the position Greentown occupied in the larger community 
and how it was a member of several networks. This positioning, as a leader in the local 
cleantech community, is also valuable to member companies. Although this does not fall 
neatly into one of Barney’s resource categories, official access to these networks through 
Greentown sponsored or hosted events, in addition to unofficial wider recognition of the 
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Greentown “brand” in this network is a valuable, rare and inimitable resource for its member 
companies. 
6.4 Inter-company resource sharing 
Proposition 3: The combination of incubator and prototyping space 
facilitates a culture of sharing that helps members accelerate each 
other’s businesses. 
Up to this point, I have considered assets which flow in from external sources, as well as 
those specifically provided for Greentown members internally. In this section, I will consider 
how resources are exchanged among the member companies such that they gain value via 
participation in the Greentown community and culture. Of this culture, Company E observed, 
“I would say, generally speaking, there is definitely a tightknit Greentown culture that goes 
across companies. There’s always exceptions, but I guess that’s what makes the 
rule.”(Company E) 
Before proceeding, a few pieces of background information should be kept in mind. When a 
company joins Greentown, they are required to sign a standard non-disclosure agreement 
(NDA). This prohibits the companies from taking the intellectual property of other members. 
It is designed to foster a more open and sharing community and is a prerequisite for the open 
prototyping area to function. New companies must also sign an agreement not to actively 
“poach” talent from other members. Finally, Greentown has a policy of not accepting new 
companies who directly compete with existing members. They may take companies with 
products who are similar, but target different market niches.   
On competition between members, Company A had some particular insight: “It is very hard 
to compete because the market is so broad. At the end of the day, everyone is really niche. So, 
we have a company here which, on the face, would compete with [Company A], but they 
target upstream water applications and we target unconventional upstream applications. So 
they’re still very different, it’s just when you lump us together, we look like competitors. A lot 
of that has to do with having a niche market entry strategy.”(Company A)  
In essence, while the member companies found in Greentown are similar because of the 
overall cleantech mission, they are also sufficiently focused in different areas that there is not 
much competition for customers. Thus, there exists a theoretical balance point of 
differentiation between member companies at which resource sharing between the companies 
would be mutually useful, but still non-threatening. 
50 
 
After evaluating the gathered evidence, I found that resource sharing does indeed occur within 
the Greentown community. Furthermore, it is divided into two primary modes: tool sharing 
and knowledge sharing. For the remainder of this chapter, I will present the evidence for these 
modes and consider how they enable members to accelerate each other’s businesses.  
6.4.1 Tool Sharing 
In the literature review, the concept of maker spaces was introduced. When beginning this 
thesis, I originally planned to find and study a cleantech-focused maker space. I hypothesized 
that the tool sharing, which is intrinsic to maker space operations, would resonate with the 
resource-scarcity focus of cleantech companies. However, as described in the methodology, I 
was unable to find any maker spaces with a cleantech focus. 
The Greentown prototyping space does not fit the basic profile of a maker space for some 
reasons which were made clear after I arrived and saw the space in person. Each company 
rents their own area and generally keeps a set of tools that they use themselves. This 
arrangement is more practical because, if all the tools were shared, the companies would be 
required to clean up whenever they stopped using a given tool. This activity would disrupt 
their workflow on a day to day basis and take a heavy toll on their time.  
Many of companies have complicated test beds and it would not be feasible for them to clean 
up in the manner required by protocols found in most maker spaces. For instance, when 
describing their workflow at Greentown, Company B said, “Here we have equipment, a 
chiller a condenser and humidity chamber and we built a couple workbenches to help us do 
all that.”  
Despite this, there is a degree of tool and other physical resource sharing which happens in the 
prototyping space. Although most of the companies keep their own set of everyday tools, it 
seems that they shared such items as were missing among companies. In addition, there is a 
set of larger and more expensive machine shop tools which were donated for common use. It 
seemed that these would be ideal for companies to use, but as we will soon see, they were not. 
I prompted the hardware based companies to talk about what kind sharing they engaged in or 
observed in the prototyping space. Companies which do not use the prototyping space were 
not asked about tool sharing. Here is a representative sample of the responses which emerged: 
Company A: “I own two of the three presses that are out there. They kind of float around but 
are [Company A]’s. One of the companies, I borrowed their drill press the other day, I just 
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walked over and said ‘Can I use this?’ Part of that entitlement is that there is kind of a 
handshake agreement not to prosecute if I use the machine poorly… Part of it is because I 
build a relationship with them. They let me use it because they know I know how to use it. 
They could always say to someone else ‘You can’t use it because we don’t trust you.’ And I 
always make sure to clean it afterwards.” 
Company B: “We borrowed a tool last week from one of our fellow companies…  But yeah, 
there is definitely this community sharing. There’s a mailing list if anyone needs anything, 
we’ll send it out… It’s a pretty open space. Everyone is kinda working on their own and 
focused on their own companies, but people are also open to talking and exchanging ideas… 
So there’s respecting space and time, but also willingness to share.”  
Company G: When discussing their relationship with one particular company, Company G 
noted: “The manufacturing of our products are pretty similar. It’s just the fact that they’re 
physically located, we’re on one side of the aisle so we share tools a lot. I’ll go over there and 
grab a Dremel, they will come over and borrow a power cord.” 
Company J (interview not recorded): This company donated some large machining tools to 
Greentown, but due to liability issues, they are rarely used. This echoes Company A’s 
anecdote about the necessity of having at least a “handshake agreement” in place before 
borrowing big tools. 
There are a few threads found throughout these interviews. First, most of the companies in the 
prototyping space do share with each other, but it seems mainly limited to smaller items. 
Nonetheless, the companies consistently mentioned that they placed value on the open culture 
which enables this. However, there are apparently liability issues surrounding use of the 
heavier machine shop tools, which deters the sharing of those. 
I also asked each company whether and how they used Artisan’s Asylum. At the time of my 
research trip, the institutional membership was having some logistical problems and so 
Greentown members were having trouble accessing it. So, in a follow-up email to the 
Greentown staff, I asked if members had started using Artisan’s Asylum more. The response 
was encouraging: “We did get those issues resolved! Now teams can go over to Artisans to 
use the membership with the "Greentown card." We realize that the tools are ‘artisan quality’ 
and not necessarily machining quality so we actually had a meeting yesterday to establish a 
more comprehensive tool shop of our own.”  
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It would be worthwhile to conduct a follow-up study to see how the planned internal machine 
shop affected members’ sharing habits, as well as how it affected their relationship with 
Artisan’s Asylum.  
Finally, there was a single anecdote which was shared by 4 different interview subjects when 
I asked about resource sharing in the space. It seems that, several years ago, Company J had a 
need for a load controller. This device costs thousands of dollars off the shelf, although it is 
possible to build it from scratch with the appropriate materials and knowledge. Thus, 
Company J worked with the engineering consultant from Artisan’s whom I interviewed and 
they built a load controller (Engineering Consultant). At the same time, Company E had the 
need for their own load controller. Although the power requirements were different and so 
they needed to use different physical components, they collaborated on the design process 
(Angel Investor). Lastly, it seems that Company A was able to borrow Company J’s controller 
at some point. This anecdote represents tens of thousands of dollars which were saved by the 
companies combined. 
6.4.2 Knowledge Sharing 
In addition to physical resource sharing, the interview subjects provided evidence of 
significant inter-company knowledge transfer. This appears in two areas: technical subject 
knowledge and cleantech financing knowledge. In this section, I will review the evidence and 
implications of both of these.  
6.4.2.1 Technical Knowledge 
First, there is a high level of technical knowledge in the member companies. This comes in 
the forms of subject matter expertise, practical knowledge of machine operations, as well as 
industry specific knowledge.  
When discussing another member company, who I was not able to interview, Company G 
gave the following narrative: “[Company X] is a very similar product to our product… so 
we’ve been working with them closely. They’re a few steps ahead of us on the manufacturing 
side. So, we’ve been kind of going with their coat tails and whoever they’re looking at for 
their manufacturing, we’ve gotten their inputs and made some connections for contract 
manufacturing that way. So, we’ve been able to leverage that a lot. They’re also working with 
us in terms of best practices for manufacturing, cause they’ve learned a lot where they’re a 
few steps ahead and they can transfer that to us and [help us] avoid some of those headaches 
with the development and launch of a product.”(Company G) 
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Company G was not alone in experiencing benefit from technical knowledge sharing within 
the Greentown community. Company E noted, “There’s also the transfer of knowledge. It’s 
just, having a big group of people, in all likelihood, somebody is close to an expert at 
whatever topic you’re looking for. I’ve certainly had other companies come to me and ask 
questions and ask for advice. And that feedback or interplay is very valuable.” (Company E) 
Each of the companies interviewed said something similar to Company G about knowledge 
transfer between members, so it seems safe to conclude that this regularly occurs in 
Greentown. 
6.4.2.2 Cleantech Financing Knowledge   
Second, there is significant collective experience among member companies in the domain of 
cleantech grant and award applications. For lack of a better term, I have dubbed this 
“cleantech financing knowledge.” As was shown earlier, VC is not accessible to cleantech 
startups in general. Therefore, the collection of grants from the government, accelerator 
programs and prize monies, as well as angel investors, is the primary way cleantech firms can 
find funding. The application process for these sources is highly competitive. In addition, it is 
a specialized process, with particular types of language and references preferred. As many 
companies in Greentown have successfully applied for these grants etc. in the past, a kind of 
institutional specialization in the grant etc. application process has been accrued. 
In my interview with Dr. Reichert, she offered an excellent summary of the situation: "There 
is institutional knowledge in these companies here. There's an understanding of how to build 
things here, big equipment and hardware that they can share amongst each other.  There's an 
understanding of how to pitch to the Catalyst Awards... There’s six or seven awards that come 
up every year. Over and over, Green Town companies win them, more than half of them, 
because we have institutional knowledge on how to do that." (Reichert) 
This type of knowledge alternately adds value and tension to Greentown. As Company A 
noted, “In some ways we are competitors because we are competing for the same capital.” 
When referring to capital here, the subject is talking about grants that typically go cleantech 
companies.  
However, the situation is more nuanced than this statement implies, because many of these 
awards can only be given once to a given company. Although most companies in Greentown 
are early stage, there are different degrees of this. Thus, companies which are slightly more 
mature, or have won different awards in the past, can actually help each other with other 
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company’s application process.  So, while it may often be the case that two or more 
Greentown companies are applying for the same capital source, there are other companies in 
Greentown who may be willing to help with the application process.  
 And yet, several of the companies interviewed stated that they had helped other companies 
apply for awards they had previously received. Company C helped Company A with their 
SBIR application, which was successful. Company A said, “Part of the way we won our NSF 
grant, I believe, one of the reasons was that when we originally drafted it, we had others in 
the company critique our applications and got some really good feedback.”  Company D 
consulted with another company (not interviewed) about their TechStars application, which 
was successful14. Other examples of this cleantech finance knowledge transfer were hinted at 
in my interviews, but the details could not be pinned down.  
6.5 Effectuation in action? 
In the previous sections, I used the resource base view to analyze resources which flow into 
Greentown, resources which originate from Greentown, and resources which are exchanged 
among member companies there. The theory of effectuation is a natural companion to the 
resource based view, as it considers the particular way that entrepreneurs use the resources 
available to them. This observation thus led to the final proposition of this study: 
Proposition 4: The resources found in cleantech-focused 
prototype-incubator ecosystem support effectual reasoning and 
processes in its members. 
Let us first briefly consider what is meant by this. As seen in the literature review, effectual 
logic is defined in contrast to causational logic. Given a goal and a set of potential methods, 
causational logic teaches one to choose the optimal method to achieve said goal. “Instead, 
[effectuation] begins with a given set of means and allows goals to emerge contingently over 
time from the varied imagination and diverse aspirations of the founders and the people they 
interact with.” (Sarasvathy) 
In Sarasvathy’s original study, she found that effectual logic was common among expert 
entrepreneurs. In summary of her study, “It was the timing and amount of effectuation 
reasoning that separated expert entrepreneurs. Especially at the early stages, expert 
entrepreneurs preferred to use effectual logic in creating new opportunities.” 
(effectuation.org) Thus, if Greentown does support its members engagement of effectual 
14 At the time of writing, TechStars has a 0.4% acceptance rate. 
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logic, it could be a significant finding. As Greentown is a resource rich environment for its 
members, it seemed logical to propose that this would support effectual reasoning and 
processes in its members. In reality, however, I found that the situation is more complicated. 
Greentown’s raison d’etre is to support early stage cleantech companies. At the same time, 
they also require that new members have a proven ability to pay rent for a minimum of 3 
months. Furthermore, although this was not always the case, they also now prefer to accept 
companies that have previously participated in a business accelerator, or been vetted in some 
other way. Dr. Reichert summed up the reasoning behind this position in our interview: 
 Basically what an accelerator program does in my mind is it starts a team with a business 
idea and turns it into a business plan and business model that has been evaluated, and the 
tires have been kicked on it, and the team has been tested. So, you know, going through a 
rigorous three month training program with your team and surviving is a good metric of long 
term survivability… And so, we like to select companies that have already gone through that. 
(Reichert) 
Among other services, many accelerator programs help entrepreneurs prepare for a “Demo 
Day,” where their product prototypes are displayed and pitched to interested investors (Bound 
and Miller). A refined product definition as well as product-market fit and business case is 
required to make an attractive pitch at these events. As we saw earlier, several of the 
companies had participated in TechStars, which is famous for its “Demo Days.” The 
Cleantech Open Northeast accelerator program does not have “Demo Day,” but they claim, 
“Entrepreneurs leave our summer program not only with a more fully developed and realized 
business, but with more connections in the Northeast cleantech community.”  
(northeast.cleantechopen.com) 
Thus, Greentown’s admission policy has the effect of raising the bar for the minimum 
development stage of most newly accepted member companies. As noted in the literature 
review, entrepreneurs engage in both effectual and causational reasoning. However, effectual 
logic is more evident in very early stages. Thus, the question becomes, Has Greentown 
effectively “outsourced” its members’ effectual processes to upstream accelerator programs? 
6.5.1 The evidence 
First, it should be noted that I did not directly inquire into the subject’s level of engagement in 
effectual logic during the interviews. Instead, this is something that was deduced forensically, 
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by looking at the history of each company’s development and at what point they became 
involved with Greentown.  
Four examples of effectual processes were found in four of the thirteen companies 
interviewed. They were all exceptional for various reasons. Two of these occurred early in the 
history of Greentown, before they had established this screening policy. The third was found 
in Grove, who was participating in TechStars at the time.  The fourth one was formed at the 
Boston Cleanweb Hackathon which was hosted by Greentown the previous year. Although 
they had not yet participated in any accelerator program, they were accepted because the 
Greentown board was familiar with the team and had confidence in their ability to succeed 
without needing to be vetted by a third party first.  
The remaining companies interviewed all had highly focused and well defined product 
concepts. They were leveraging the Greentown space and network to develop these into 
minimum viable products, but did not appear to be iterating their product concept 
significantly – that is, engaging in effectuation - based on resources found in Greentown. This 
conclusion is further supported by the earlier observation that the hardware companies often 
come to Greentown after making the decision to build a prototype. They already have a clear 
idea of their goal and view Greentown as a means to achieve it, which is a typical example of 
causational logic. 
6.5.2 Other considerations 
The ACTION Award gives Cleantech Open semifinalists subsidized rent in ACTION network 
incubators, Greentown included, while they participate in the Cleantech Open accelerator 
program. As we saw earlier, many companies in Greentown have taken advantage of this. 
Similarly, an entrepreneur who is willing and able to work a “day job” to fund their 
Greentown-based company on evenings and weekends with their 24/7 access card, may 
continue to engage in effectual processes. Although I was not able to interview any companies 
which used this approach, I was told that it was popular by Company K. This approach, 
however, may also place an unreasonable burden on entrepreneurs with family obligations or 
other constraints and thus limits participation. 
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6.5.3 Does it matter? 
By generally increasing the minimum development stage of accepted companies, Greentown 
has lowered the average level of risk of failure by its member companies. This enables a more 
reliable rent income, to support its continued existence and make plans for future resource 
developments, such as the machine shop. At the same time, it means that very early stage 
cleantech entrepreneurs no longer have the benefit of easy access to the wealth of resources at 
Greentown and are less free to engage in effectual processes. 
The ACTION award somewhat mitigates this. However, after the 4 month subsidy runs out, 
the companies may find themselves in a difficult situation. If they have not developed 
sufficient cash flow or found other sources of funding in that period to support continued rent 
moving forward, they may leave Greentown. 
 I was able to meet Company M largely by chance. As they had left Greentown just a few 
weeks prior to my arrival, I caught them as they transitioned out. They had left after their 
ACTION award subsidy ran out. In a follow-up email with Company M’s founder, I learned 
that they are looking for funding so that they can return to Greentown. “I am currently at 
another incubator space working with the other company I am with (for money) and meeting 
up with the [Company M] team in coffeeshops when we need to get together. We are currently 
looking for funding so with some of that money we are looking to move back into 
Greentown.” 
Company M is just one data point. My interviews were subject to selection bias, since I only 
had ready access to companies that were currently in Greentown, not those that had left. Thus, 
I was not able to determine how common this kind of scenario is in reality.  However, 
Company M’s experience did reveal what seems like a kind of structural crack that very early 
stage companies may fall through. 
As described earlier, hardware based cleantech startups tend to have a significantly longer 
development period than IT ones. Even Company M’s business model innovation was taking 
time to develop positive cash flow. Their non-profit partnership structure made it attractive to 
potential customers, but not to investors needed to bring the product to fruition. They found 
themselves in the classic “valley of death” situation. Greentown attempts to meet the needs of 
cleantech startups by not limiting the amount of time that companies can stay, as many 
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incubators do. However, it is still difficult for companies without cashflow to take advantage 
of the resources found there, after their ACTION award subsidy finishes. 
In the literature review, I presented a criticism of incubators: they enable companies which 
should fail to continue for an unnaturally long time. By only accepting companies which have 
been proven in some way previously, Greentown addresses this to an extent. At the end of the 
day, Greentown has a rent seeking business model. It needs tenants who can reliably pay and 
cannot afford to subsidize the effectual and discovery based processes of its members. In 
“professionalizing” their admissions process, Greentown did indeed outsource effectuation to 
a large extent. By limiting themselves to companies which are passed the effectuation 
dominated phase, or those with the ability to hold a day job which can fund their Greentown 
based company in the evenings, they effectively limit the range of innovation and opportunity 
creation that can take place within its walls. This trade-off was arguably necessary for them to 
ensure a reliable rent income and better support for existing members.  
However, despite being slightly ripened, the member companies are generally still early-
stage. They have opportunities to pivot their strategy with relative ease, based on access to 
unexpected resources found in Greentown, such as the investor and customer tours described 
earlier. I was not able to find any concrete examples of these chance meetings resulting in 
follow-up meetings or deals, although it may be that I did not interview enough companies. 
Or, it may be that visitors tend to make their visits with a specific goal or company in mind 
and it is not a realistic possibility that chance meetings will bear fruit. It is impossible to say at 
present, although this could make an interesting line of inquiry for further research. 
In conclusion, this proposition was found to be largely false. Although in its early days, 
Greentown was more relaxed about the stage of companies it accepts, they now look for 
members that have a defined product and preferably some kind vetting through an accelerator 
program. Thus, the newer companies that come to Greentown will have already engaged in 
the bulk of their effectual processes prior to joining. 
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7 Conclusion  
The goal of this study was to examine one possible tool to support cleantech entrepreneurship: 
a cleantech-focused incubator-prototyping space. The question was then asked: “How can a 
cleantech-focused incubator-prototyping space ecosystem support the entrepreneurial 
processes of its members? I attempted to answer this question by making case study of 
Greentown Labs, a space which fits this profile. A number of propositions were posited and 
subsequently explored by examining the evidence collected during the study. These findings 
can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 1: A cleantech-focused incubator can act as a convergence point for 
industry relevant input streams. 
Finding: Greentown relies heavily on external input streams of resources from local 
university graduates, accelerator programs and government grants. These resources exist 
independently of Greentown, but their convergence adds value to the community. 
Proposition 2: A cleantech-focused incubator can provide member companies 
access to relevant strategic resources.  
Finding: The internal resources available at Greentown seem to support the cleantech 
entrepreneurship activities of its members in a number of ways. Specifically, the combination 
of a typical incubator office space and prototyping space is a rare and valuable resource for 
the hardware companies. In addition, sponsor provided resources lower capital barriers for 
startups with typical cash flow issues. Finally, the network access provided by Greentown 
membership is a significant resource because it is inimitable, in addition to valuable and rare. 
Proposition 3: The combination of incubator and prototyping space facilitates a 
culture of sharing that helps members accelerate each other’s businesses. 
 
Finding: The companies are valuable resources for each other. This manifests itself in both 
tool and knowledge sharing. It is made possible by the open culture of Greentown. It is further 
supported by the fact that the companies are similar enough to have overlapping competencies 
and needs, but are not so similar as to be competitors in the marketplace. 
Proposition 4: The cleantech-focused prototype-incubator ecosystem supports effectual 
processes of entrepreneurs.  
 
Finding: Greentown does not generally support effectual processes in its 
members by virtue of its rent requirements and admissions guidelines. 
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7.1 Implications and future research 
This study has a number of theoretical implications, as well as practical management and 
policy centered ones. Each implication raises questions for future research. 
7.1.1 Theoretical implications 
7.1.1.1 Incubators and the Resource Base View 
The Resource Based View is well established and the VRIO/VRIN framework is a useful tool 
for analyzing how certain internal resources support a firm’s competitive advantage. This 
analysis can be further improved by factoring in dynamic capabilities, as well as recognizing 
the role of path dependency and causal ambiguity in resource development. However, when 
considering organizations which do not resemble a traditional firm, the resource based view 
may be inadequate. In the case of incubators, it is necessary to distinguish between resources 
which originate externally and yet still converge at and benefit the incubator in some way, and 
those resources which are intrinsic to the incubator and only accessible to members. 
This study attempted to grapple with this distinction by imagining external resources as input 
streams. The idea found some initial support in the given case, but requires significant further 
study before being submitted as a worthy addition to the resource based view. In addition, the 
incubator relationship to external input streams could be framed as a new type of ecosystem 
for entrepreneurship, although further research is necessary to develop this idea further. The 
level of resource flow from local schools, accelerators and government awards should be 
investigated in more detail as a variable in incubator performance. Furthermore, the contrast 
between these input flows supporting independent firms verses their convergence in an 
incubator environment should be measured and evaluated. If found to be positively correlated, 
the results would have implications for whether and how to pursue efforts to “grease the 
wheels” between an incubator and particular resource streams from its environment. 
7.1.1.2 Effectuation : Accelerators :: Causation: Incubators?  
I found that Greentown preferred to accept companies with a fleshed out business plan and 
product concept. They achieved this largely by accepting companies which had previously 
participated in accelerators or other competitions that are designed to help aspiring 
entrepreneurs with accomplishing those self-same goals.  It is not known whether most 
incubators have a similar policy or if this is unique to Greentown. However, the finding that 
business accelerators seem to support their companies’ effectual processes is exciting. In fact, 
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a reader of accelerator informational materials today would find an abundance of phrases like 
“pivot,” “iterate,” or “find the best product-market fit” as common services to their 
participants. These terms seem to closely parallel known effectual processes and, so, the 
mechanisms by which this occur bears closer investigation.  
7.1.1.3 Hardware vs software accelerators 
This study found that the needs of hardware based companies are dramatically different than 
those of software or service based companies. This is an obvious conclusion, and yet there are 
relatively few resources today to support hardware based startups. Although TechStars 
recently started accepting hardware based companies and a few other specialized hardware 
accelerators have started appearing in the last few years, they remain exceptional. Due to their 
newness, it is not also yet clear that the traditional accelerator model is appropriate for 
hardware based companies, due to their longer development cycles and unique resource 
requirements. A specialized framework which factors in the needs of hardware based startups 
should be developed to assess the effectiveness of these programs. 
When discussing the future of Greentown, I learned that they plan to develop an experimental 
program that provides a hybrid accelerator-incubator which lasts for a full year (instead of the 
3 months duration that is more typical of accelerators). This longer duration is designed to 
better cater to the needs of a hardware startups. As the participants will also have a cleantech 
focus, typical venture funding issues need to be considered. The program would address this 
by supporting its participants to develop industry partnerships through its network. If this 
program goes into effect, it would make an excellent subject of a longitudinal study, 
particularly when compared to the shorter term hardware accelerators that are appearing. 
7.1.2 Managerial Implications 
A few lessons were learned when observing Greentown operations. We saw earlier that access 
to large machine shops is beyond a typical startup’s budget. For hardware companies, this is a 
highly valuable resource. At the same time, despite the presence of several such machines at 
Greentown, their usage was stunted by liability, quality and trust issues. It seems that there is 
a relatively straightforward solution to this that is already in use by Artisan’s Asylum and 
many other maker spaces. For shared machining tools, a certification course which includes 
proper machine usage and safety protocols could be coupled with a liability waiver to increase 
tool usage and thus increase their overall value to members. 
62 
 
It was also found that several of the interviewed companies were unaware of the sponsor 
resources made available to them as members. Beyond the presence of the “sponsor wall,” 
they did not have any kind of materials detailing the resources made available by each 
sponsors. In order to increase their value to and usage by member companies, it may worth 
developing some kind of unified documentation presenting this information. 
More broadly, it was found that there is an open culture in Greentown which is highly valued 
by its members. In fact, for the companies interviewed that did not use the prototyping space, 
this culture was cited as their primary reasoning for joining and staying. It was also 
considered a significant source of value for the hardware companies. This sense of 
community seems to arise from a combination of factors: the companies are similar enough to 
be helpful to each other but not similar enough to be competitive, they all sign an NDA, and 
they mingle regularly in the open office and prototyping space and at events. Furthermore, 
Greentown had the luck of growing with the support of a bonafide institutional leader. While 
not impossible to for other organizations to acquire their own institutional leader, it is 
notoriously difficult to do so. “Culture starts at the top” is a phrase that I heard in one 
interview, reference to Dr. Reichert and her role in shaping Greentown (startup consultant).  
Preserving and further developing this positive and open culture should be an important part 
of Greentown’s future activities, as an invisible asset with considerable value. Further 
research into defining specific aspects of this culture and how it can be fostered in other 
similar spaces may also be worthwhile  
7.1.3 Policy Implications 
As seen in the introduction, Norway has a documented problem with both innovation in 
general and cleantech entrepreneurship in particular.  However, if the Norwegian Research 
Council or related agencies decide to develop a space which supports cleantech 
entrepreneurship in a manner similar to Greentown Labs, there will be some significant 
challenges. 
A common top-down approach to Science Park design in the past has emphasized the internal 
resources that are provided to members. However, this study revealed that this view is one 
sided and fails to consider the significant role that external input streams play incubator 
success. It must be recognized that the success of an incubator is highly dependent on its 
context and have relevant and high quality resource input streams. They particularly come in 
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the form of university students and graduates, government grants and possibly other local 
incubators and accelerator programs which can feed into it.  
Although not the focus of my thesis, it may be implicitly inferred from the results that one 
way to increase the quantity and quality of dealflow to current and future Norwegian 
incubators may be to support programs which provide similar input streams. For example, the 
MassCEC intern program seems to effectively support existing local startups while also 
creating a pipeline for future entrepreneurial talent. The Cleantech Open and Mass Challenge 
programs also provided significant dealflow for new Greentown companies. Investigating 
these or similar programs further to develop a model for a comprehensive entrepreneurial 
ecosystem may be worthwhile. 
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Appendix 
 
Interview Guide 
Member Company Employee Guiding Questions: 
First, get basic information: number of founders and employees, founder backgrounds, date of 
founding, date of when they joined Greentown, main product and business model.  
Then: 
Why did your company join Green Town Labs? 
Where were you before joining? What is different? How has Greentown effected the company? 
Do you use the physical resources found here? If so, how? 
Do you employ the incubator services made available by the Green Town staff and partners? If so, 
how? 
How do you interact with the other companies here? Do you ever help each other or collaborate? 
If so, how? 
How do you view your fellow companies here? 
What would your company be doing if you were not in Green Town?  
How has the proximity to Artisan’s Asylum effected you? Do you use your institutional 
membership? If so, how? 
 
Green Town Administration Guiding Questions: 
What services do you offer your member companies (both formal and informal)? 
How do you find member companies? If there are many applicants, what criteria do you use to 
select them? 
Why did you recently move from Boston to Somerville?  
What is your role here? How do you support member companies? 
What kind of resource sharing – physical or otherwise -- among member companies have you 
observed? 
What is your vision for the future of Green Town? 
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Other incubators near Greentown 
Table 8 Business incubators within a 1 hour radius of Greentown 
Name Note 
Arthur M Blank Center for Entrepreneurship Associated with Babson College 
BioSquare Focused on biomedical companies 
Cambridge Innovation Center Currently home to over 600 companies, 
mostly startups 
Enterprise Center at Salem State University - 
Institute for Energy & Sustainability A “virtual” incubator. Offers services, 
but no physical space 
Massachusetts Biomedical Initiatives Focused on biomedical companies. 
Massachusetts Medical Device Development Center Focused on biomedical companies. 
Newburyport CleanTech Center A similar mission to Greentown 
North Shore InnoVentures Double focus on cleantech and biotech 
Quincy Center for Innovation Associated with Eastern Nazarene College, 
South Shore Innovation and the City of 
Quincy 
Commercial Ventures and Intellectual Property Tech transfer office for the University of 
Massachusetts 
Venture Development Center Located on University of Massachusetts 
Boston campus, but contains teams from 
many different universities. 
 
Incubators with documented crossover with Greentown are highlighted. 
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Member benefits for New England Clean Energy Council 
(cleanenergycouncil.org): 
Tangible Benefits 
• Free and/or discounted attendance at NECEC events 
• Discounts on tickets or tables at Green Tie Gala 
• Discounts on industry partner events and conferences 
• Discount on exhibiting at industry partner conference showcase 
• Marketing exposure on our website, in our newsletter, through the press and on 
Twitter 
• Coordination of meetings and communications with state and federal government 
officials 
• Group insurance rates on health and property/casualty insurance through our partners 
at Chubb Group and William Gallagher Associates 
• Lobbying dollars saved through coordination of meetings with policymakers 
Intangible Benefits 
• Network with other clean energy thought leaders and influencers 
• Uncover new business, investment and research opportunities 
• Influence, impact and educate policymakers 
• Enhance your organization’s profile by participating in initiatives promoting economic 
growth, job creation and regional clean energy cluster development  
• Generate innovative ideas through interaction with domain experts  
• Show that your organization is committed to helping to grow the region’s clean energy 
economy 
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 Agencies with SBIR programs (sbir.gov) 
• Department of Agriculture 
• Department of Commerce - National Institute of Standards and Technology 
• Department of Commerce - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
• Department of Defense 
• Department of Education 
• Department of Energy 
• Department of Health and Human Services 
• Department of Homeland Security 
• Department of Transportation 
• Environmental Protection Agency 
• National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
• National Science Foundation 
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Funding sources for Greentown companies 
I have placed an * next to the funds awarded to companies that do not fit the given definition 
of cleantech. Greentown has a small number of companies (six at the time of writing) that do 
not align with their cleantech-focused mission, in industries ranging from robotics to oil and 
gas. It is not clear why these companies chose to make their home at Greentown or why they 
were accepted. These funds are asterisked because they are not typically awarded to clean 
tech companies, as discussed in the section titled “The resource stream that wasn’t: Venture 
Capital”.  
Funding Sources 
National Science Foundation (NSF) SBIR 
Department of Energy (DOE) SBIR 
California Energy Commission 
Maine Technology Institute 
Massachusetts Clean Energy Center (MassCEC) 
Boston Lean Startup Challenge 
Startup Open 
New Energy Symposium 
U-Launch Prize 
CTSI Utility Challenge 
Duke Startup Challenge 
Charlotte Venture Challenge 
ARPA Energy GRIDS  
WPI Venture Forum Technology Track 
Xsite Xconomy pitch 
MIT Accelerate 
MIT Business Competition 
MIT Clean Energy Prize 
Cleantech Open Northeast 
ACTION award 
Fraunhofer TechBridge 
Bolt 
Cleantech Innovations New England 
Alaska Energy Authority 
Conoco Phillips Energy Prize 
Department of Energy (DOE) 
NSTAR 
City of Boston Green Triple Decker Pilots 
Fraunhofer Energy Savings Study 
Innovate Mass Commercialization Grant 
MassCEC Catalyst Grant 
CommonAngels Venture Fund 
Launch Capital 
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NAVAIR 
NCIAA 
Villgro 
21 Ventures 
Solgenix 
Grayghost Ventures 
Invested Development 
CASIS Grant* 
DHS ARI Grant* 
TrueVentures* 
Slow Venture* 
Highland Capital Partners Summer@Highland* 
Rough Draft Ventures* 
Energy Ventures* 
Chevron Technology Ventures* 
Mertz Holdings* 
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